

## Book Reviews

Another shortcoming is the Review's dual-track approach to world developments and Canadian events. No effort has been made to draw out the Canadian role and the relative impact of Canada in such forums as multilateral arms control negotiations, the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Nor is a separate focus given to Canada-United States defence relations. Such a bridging chapter would be a worthwhile addition in future editions.

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### Thinking about defence

by George Lindsey

*Strategic Defense and the Western Alliance* edited by Sanford Lakoff and Randy Willoughby. Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company (original publisher Lexington Books of Lexington, Mass.), 1987, 218 pages, US\$44.75.

Although the material in this book predates the Reykjavik summit and the INF Treaty, most of the analyses are still very relevant to the prospects for strategic defence and its probable significance for the Western alliance.

Two of the papers discuss the impact of strategic defences on superpower relations. Herbert York believes that while offence will always overcome defence, the radical reduction in the total megatonnage of the US strategic forces (by 80 percent between 1965 and 1985) is due in part to Soviet air defences. These have motivated the US to transfer payload from big free-fall bombs to standoff missiles, electronic countermeasures and extra fuel. The feature which worries York is the short warning time and rapid action associated with the use of space weapons against either offensive ballistic missiles in their boost phase or against defensive space vehicles, as contrasted to the half-hour or several hours inherent in ballistic and airborne weapons separated from their targets by intercontinental distances. John Holdren also fears the employment of space-based weapons against the opponent's defences, a capability that could encourage hair-trigger action and a destabilizing first strike

strategy. He is convinced that the ABM Treaty should be augmented by an Anti-Satellite (ASAT) agreement.

Two papers describe conceivable deployments for the European theater. Gregory Canavan considers interception of ballistic missiles of theater range to be easier than for intercontinental range, and advocates introduction of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) as stabilizing. François Heisbourg investigates the possibility of extending ground-based air defence systems to make them able to intercept conventionally-armed theater missiles.


David Yost and Pierre Lellouche offer different analyses of the impact of SDI on alliance strategy. Both are apprehensive that the USSR is developing the capability for rapid deployment ("breakout") of BMD, including defence against tactical ballistic missiles. Added to their strong air defences, this could neutralize NATO's strategy of flexible response and escalation control, diminish the credibility of the British and French deterrents, and increase the probability that a war starting in Europe would remain conventional and confined to Europe, where the Warsaw Pact has the advantage. Yost warns of a Soviet "creepout" from the restrictions of the ABM Treaty, and argues that a countervailing program for BMD by the European members of NATO would be stabilizing. Lellouche, who is more concerned with political than military aspects, believes that deployment of BMD by both sides would do more harm than good to Western Europe, probably motivating Britain and France to strengthen their offensive nuclear forces for a counter-city role.

Trevor Taylor does not believe that Soviet BMD can neutralize the independent British and French deterrents. He remarks that Trident is under more immediate threat from UK politics than it is from SDI. Another judgment, relevant to Canada, is that "The United States seems more likely to be swayed by those who support SDI in principle, as a research program, than by those who oppose it outright." Ernst-Otto Czempel describes German concerns over the American propensity to act without consultation. The FRG relies on flexible response, arms control and equal security for each ally. They do not oppose SDI as a research program, but fear the consequences of any deployment beyond point defence.

This rather diverse collection of essays demonstrates that the questions associated with strategic defence have very compli-

cated political, technological and economic as well as strategic aspects, especially when the defence of Europe is taken into consideration as well as that of the two superpowers.

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### To ban — or to limit?

by Simon Rosenblum

*Nuclear Weapon Tests: Prohibition or Limitation?* edited by Jozef Goldblat and David Cox. Toronto: Oxford University Press (original publisher Oxford University Press of New York), 1988, 423 pages, \$100.00.

A comprehensive test ban (CTB) has been high on arms control agenda since the atomic age began. No other measure of nuclear weapons control has been sought for so long, so persistently and with so much dedication by the non-nuclear nations, both aligned and non-aligned. It is regarded by most of them as the single most important first step towards halting and then reversing the nuclear arms race. This collection — although outrageously expensive — is by far the best source on the current prospects for a CTB. The book is