World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Many significant changes are taking place in these instatutions, but they are not sufficient to meet the requests of some developing countries. By giving too broad a mandate to the UN global negotiations conference in New York, where the majority control is in the hands of the Group of 77, these countries including particularly the United States are worried that changes will be dictated to the financial institutions that will be detrimental to their interests. For them, the best way to prevent such development is to make certain that the mandate given to the global negotiations conference does not allow it to interfere in the affairs of the financial institutions.

Procedures

i hi

ation

umr

way

lopu

rt a

 $\mathbf{ppl}_{\mathsf{l}}$

Im

of t

m b

und

t, ti

its a

l trie

ivea

alize

wer

e pr

Yor

oons

voul

lize

uire

weet

rthe

vari

men

) 01

f th

on

ltie

hop

am

COD

time

ıaki

mit

com

dia

tion

to

alls

When the Assembly Chairman opened the Special ssion, he established an Ad Hoc Committee under the chairmanship of the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Michel Dupuy. In turn, Ambassador Dupuy set up two working groups, one responsible for the global negotiations and the other for the Internabional Development strategy.

The global negotiations working group tried very hard to produce a paper on the procedures to be followed during the global negotiations, but when it appeared the group was no longer able to make further progress, Ambassador Dupuy convened meetings of a very small group composed of representatives of the Group of 77 and of industrialized countries. Before these meetings could take place, the spokesman for the Group of 77 had to convene a meeting of his group to obtain a mandate for the points under discussion. As the interests of the countries of this group are often quite divergent, it is generally very difficult for them to reach agreement. For that reason, their spokesman is forced to be very rigid in presenting the Group of 77's point of view, as he knows that if agreement with the other groups is not possible within the parameters of his negotiating mandate, it will be a long process to obtain new instructions.

For the industrialized countries, the process is quite different. Some countries and particularly ance maintain that the New York UN forum is politcal and that each sovereign country should have the right to speak with its own, distinct voice. This principle was adapted to meet the requirements of political consultations amongst the countries of the European Community where these countries seek a common postion and speak through a single spokesman. This derelopment adds an interesting dimension to the consultations amongst themselves to establish a common position.

Once they have reached one, they then meet with the other Western industrialized countries but with a

1. 420

certain rigidity in their approach as they try not to deviate from their already established common position. Within the group of industrialized countries, no attempt is made to reach a common position as the French and a few others do not want this process of consultations to go further than an exchange of views. Therefore when the industrialized countries meet with the Group of 77, they speak with many voices (i.e. one for the European Community and one for each of the other countries) while the Group of 77 speaks with only one voice. This system enables the Group of 77 to profit from it and allows them to play on the apparent differences in the group of industrialized countries.

This was often evident in the restricted meetings called by Ambassador Dupuy, where on the one hand the spokesman for the Group of 77 adhered to a very strict line, while the representatives of the Western industrialized countries spoke with many voices.

At the very beginning of the Special Session, countries of the Group of 77 made it clear that their main objective was a firm commitment on the part of the industrialized countries to spend 0.7 percent of their Gross National Product (GNP) on official development assistance (ODA) by 1984. This presented a major difficulty for the Canadian delegation, because Ottawa had not yet decided on its level of expenditures in that field. In his address to the Session on August 26, 1980 the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dr. Mark MacGuigan, was therefore not in a position to indicate what commitment the Canadian government would be prepared to accept.

Overseas Development Assistance

In the negotiations that followed, the Canadian delegation had to ask for special understanding. The Group of 77 countries acknowledged our problem, but just barely as they did not want to let us off the hook and thereby weaken their negotiating strategy. Fortunately for Canada, the Session was extended and the deadline for meeting the commitment was changed from 1984 to 1990. The extension gave enough time to the government to take a decision on ODA and at the closing session on September 15, Dr. MacGuigan was able to announce that the government had decided to reverse the trend of the last few years under which Canadian ODA was declining as a proportion of GNP. He stated that ODA would once again move upwards and would reach a level of 0.5 percent of GNP by the middle of the decade. Thereafter, the Canadian intention was to accept the need to reach an ODA level of 0.7 percent of GNP by the end of the decade and to employ its best efforts to reach that objective.

Other points of contention related to international and financial issues and to energy. On the first issues, the Group of 77 countries wanted to pursue in the international development strategy the same aims they