manently closed to them, because we have up to now merely expressed preferences that would be "important factors" — but not necessarily determining ones — in any decision we made.

The least that can be said about this is that the distinction between these categories is as clear as crystal! We shall not return to the third paradox we mentioned above, but it is quite obvious that the language we are using now is hardly consistent with the moral ideals we are proclaiming, and that we are not prepared to apply these principles fully in practice because the nature of the international system forces us to make compromises.

Problem of numbers

My colleague Professor Jean-Pierre Derriennic reminded me not long ago of the problem posed by the great number of states involved. Everything goes on as if Canada had the impression it was acting alone in the international system, and was able to prevent the proliferation of nuclear arms by its moral interdictions alone.

In reality, Canada can easily adopt a policy that, as we have just seen, is not too illogical, and can do everything in its power to bring the other states to think as it would like them to think. The fact remains, however, that some countries have no intention of discussing things the way we do, and all this seems to me to be consistent with the reality of the international system.

Some countries will not discuss on our terms

Some countries, in fact, have no intention of adhering to the treaty; others prefer to maintain their bilateral co-operation shielded from any international indiscretion; and some have no qualms about weaving preferential links among themselves, the results of which are unknown at the moment.

The larger question of whether or not it is possible to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes in itself a great historical debate, but I do not intend to get into long discussions here. Suffice it to say that there are two schools of thought on the matter — the optimistic and the pessimistic. The optimists consider that we are living in a period of profound interdependence, that the world has changed, that national nuclear defence is an absurdity, and that we are moving towards a form of ecumenism stamped with the seal of compassion between men and between nations. The pessimists, on the other hand, say that nothing has changed, that nationalism is reviving, and that the proliferation of nuclear arms is inevitable. The truth probably lies somewhere between these two positions, and all that we can reasonably say is that, cannot stop the proliferation of n arms, we can at least slow it down.

It is perfectly understandable Canada does not want to be associat any way, directly or indirectly, wit spread of nuclear arms. It is also logical and desirable that very strict be kept on our problems with co-operation assistance. However, ponsibility ends there.

It would take too long to explai reasons for this choice. We have al mentioned some; others are easy to Of the latter, one is basic: wides dissemination of nuclear technology necessarily go hand in hand wit growth process in the civilian Whether a country uses technolo peaceful or military purposes will a depend ultimately on how it asses own national interest. When we co that it takes from five to six years a reactor to operate at full capaci that the reactor will be operation 30 years, it would be presumptuo think that the conditions on wh contract is concluded today will b same in 36 years. This does no that the promises made will nece be broken, but it does mean that reasonable to expect that there w difficulties and that some nation refuse to be confined to a status of p nent nuclear weakness if they fe their security cannot be assured o than by nuclear armament. This is for the signatory as for the non-sig countries, except that in the first would be fairer to use the *langua probabilities* and, in the second, *presumptions* whose validity remain demonstrated.

If it is true, however, that th gress of technology cannot be s and that Canada enjoys an unde comparative advantage in the f nuclear technology, it is hard to s it should be reproached for using advantage the master card it hol tually, a sound Canadian policy o proliferation, in order to be pla would involve four conditions. The f that it should not obtain an a weapon itself, which does not see much of a problem at the mome second is that it should ensure th technology, equipment and fissi materials are used only for peaceful poses. Canada's responsibility end because we have no control over w state does outside the framework o co-operation. The third condition is