

may also have been irritated by the significant part played by Canada in the Disarmament Commission last week.<sup>13</sup> In any event, the Soviet position on the inclusion of Canadian troops found no support either from members of the Council, or the Secretary-General, or the African members who participated in the debate. The silence of the Congolese representative seems particularly significant.

24.

DEA/6386-40

*L'ambassadeur en Union soviétique  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Soviet Union  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 410

Moscow, August 24, 1960

CONFIDENTIAL. PRIORITY.

Reference: Your Tel S-107 Aug 19.†

Repeat Permis New York from Ottawa (Information).

## SOVIET ATTITUDE TO HAMMARSKJÖLD AND UN

1. In my Despatch 887 August 22† I discussed this subject at length. I do not repeat not think Soviet government is trying to force Hammarskjöld out of office at this time. My Indian, American, French and UK colleagues agree with me about this. It is probably true that Soviet leaders do not repeat not like Hammarskjöld's imaginative concept of role of UN and particularly his readiness to take responsibility and conduct an operation of magnitude involved in military and economic aid programme necessary for salvation of Congo. The Soviets prefer working on a bilateral basis in order to extract maximum amount of political advantage. Hence their opposition to Hammarskjöld's proposal for an economic mission to Congo. The Soviet attitude to the whole UN operation in Congo will be more apparent when the time comes for member nations to make contributions to it. It may well be that Soviet government though not repeat not now trying to force Hammarskjöld out of office [will] oppose any attempt to reappoint him for a further term but conditions may change before this question becomes urgent.

2. Most colleagues with whom I have spoken agree that Soviets fully realize that its influence in UN is likely to increase with admission of many countries with neutralist policies. Therefore in long run Soviet government will not repeat not want to weaken authority of UN. The Congo however is a special case. The Soviet government is most anxious to preserve authority of a leader such as Lumumba who if not repeat not a communist is now more [sympathetic?] to east than west as against Tshombe who has Belgian and some western support as well. If Soviet government succeeds in having Lumumba's authority restored in whole of Congo and Belgian and Western influence substantially reduced then its attitude towards Hammarskjöld and UN may well change.

3. Quite apart from considerations mentioned in foregoing paragraphs I think that campaign against Hammarskjöld and UN will diminish. Soviet leaders are aware that their campaign does not repeat not [group corrupt] support of other African states with exception of Guinea. Again Mr. Nehru's powerful public support for Hammarskjöld and his helpful action in making Dayal available to him must have some influence here.

<sup>13</sup> Voir/See document 93.