

erations of natural reason, that man is responsible for his belief; and that the grounds on which the opposite opinion is advocated, are unphilosophical and untenable. This may have the advantage of disembarassing your consideration of the question, of the jealousy which is not unfrequently entertained of Theological dogmas, as well as of better assisting you in meeting on their own ground the advocates of man's non-responsibility, who, unable to grapple with the clear and explicit testimony of Scripture on the subject, usually take refuge in the dim and broken light of reason, or in what they pompously term, the enlightened philosophy of modern times.

And first and before entering on the more rigid examination of the question, there is a preliminary remark as to a consequence inevitably resulting from the doctrine of man's non-responsibility for his belief, to which it will be of use to call your attention, as being fitted both to show you the extensive and vital bearings of the question under discussion, and to prove, as by a simple *reductio ad absurdum*, the untenableness of that doctrine,—and that is, that if man be not responsible to God for his beliefs, then there is scarcely any thing for which with consistency, he can be held to be responsible.

In religious matters especially—the most important of all—a man's habitual feelings and conduct must be chiefly determined by his beliefs. Nay, it might easily be shown, that certain feelings and actions, corresponding with the beliefs cherished, must as necessarily flow from these beliefs, as belief itself is supposed necessarily to flow from the manner in which the evidence of truth presents itself to the mind. Who can for a moment doubt, that the beliefs which a man entertains in relation to the questions,—whether the Bible is the word of God, or whether Christ is the son of God, and the Saviour of sinners, or whether man is here on trial for eternity,—an eternity which, terminating the evanescent distinctions of earth, shall know but two classes of men,—the good and the bad, the inhabitants of heaven, and the inhabitants of hell,—must of necessity tell, and powerfully tell, alike upon his feelings and his life?

Now, if there be no responsibility for belief, on what principle, or with what consistency, can a man be held responsible for the feelings or actions which flow from that belief, and which are only the necessary effect, the simple, natural, inevitable product of that belief.

With regard to actions in particular; whenever belief is the source