

But this happened unfortunately not to be the case ; the General did not get to Halifax till about the 3d of July, which was 27 days after Mr. *Revest* and Mr. *Beaufremont* had got to Louisbourg, and four days after Mr. *la Motthe* ; nor did the *Admiral* arrive at Halifax till the 9th of July. I shall therefore proceed to examine the reasons assigned by the writer of the Bristol letter, for the *General's* and *Admiral's* not proceeding *then* to Louisbourg.

In the first place, he says, that one 64 gun ship lying in the harbour of Louisbourg would render the landing of Troops upon the Island impracticable ; whereas there were eighteen capital Ships there, when the *Admiral* arrived at Halifax ; his words are, “ Ships of war lying in the harbour [of Louisbourg] command in such manner the place, where our Troops must necessarily debark, that early as we [New England men] were, had the *Vigilant*, a ship of 64 guns, got in, instead of being taken by Sir *Peter Warren*, she would have rendered our landing impracticable ;” and he says, “ That the *General* ought to have landed on *Cape Breton* before any ships of war from France or Quebec could get there to annoy his troops in their debarkation ; that instead of that the list [of the English and French squadrons annexed to his letter] “ will shew, that there were eighteen capital Ships of war in Louisbourg harbour ten days before *Admiral Holbourn* arrived at Halifax ; that his [the General's] first intelligence was indeed, that there were only seven capital Ships of war in the har-