

The Address—Mr. Blackmore

least of those indirect effects was the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause which was forced upon Britain by the United States in 1922. That was one of the most mischievous measures ever advocated by a people in the history of the world. Its effect upon Britain and other nations of the world has been incalculable in dire results.

The continued improvement in the use of machines, solar energy and technological skills ushered the western world from an age of scarcity into an age of abundance about 1928. By an age of abundance I mean an age in which people were able to produce more goods than they were able to sell under the financial system under which they operated. This fact, resulting in failure to distribute the world's abundance, precipitated the great depression of 1930, again emanating from the United States. The effects of this upon Britain were catastrophic.

World war II then broke upon Britain, with results, direct and indirect, disastrous beyond description. From the date of the onset of that unprecedented misfortune, Britain has been victimized by all her foes and most of her, on the face of it, friends. The treacherous devices of these false friends have been well-nigh unbelievable, not only by reason of their diabolically mischievous effect upon Britain, but also by reason of their abject stupidity when judged by considerations of enlightened self-interest of even the perpetrators themselves. Surely the nations that had to do with causing these difficulties, that today are almost screaming about the inability of Britain to discharge responsibilities which she would have discharged had those nations given Britain a chance—

An hon. Member: Who are they?

Mr. Blackmore: I will name them some time; I do not feel disposed to do so now. I could give them easily. Thanks for asking the question. I will give the hon. member the answer off the record any time he cares to come around to my room. I will enlighten him in a way that will startle him. For the present benefit of the hon. member, one example is Bretton Woods. If he can find out who initiated Bretton Woods and who jammed it down Britain's throat, he will be able to get the clue to the whole situation. Finally we come to the so-called post-war period. Throughout the feverish years since 1946, Britain has heroically striven to carry her full share of the load. Statistics establish that, in the absolute, she has borne far more of the burden than even her population could warrant. Considering Britain's wounds during the war, inflicted by her foes, and those during the war's aftermath, inflicted by her

false friends,—or should I say foolishly selfish friends?—Britain has carried, and has been expected to carry, a weight of effort utterly beyond her capacity to endure, for long.

Something must be done to reinforce Canada's advance base, Britain. It must be done soon. What shall it be? What part shall Canada play in the matter? This is a question which I submit is of the most vital interest to every Canadian breathing today.

Britain has men, well trained, brave, unbeatable. But Britain needs materials desperately, goods for human needs, goods for military needs. Canada has the goods. Canada has extensive resources to produce more goods. Hardly a Canadian commodity could be named as to which Canada probably could not double her production in a few years if she deliberately set herself to do so.

The Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) estimated our 1951 production at \$20 billion worth of goods. Unquestionably we can produce much more goods in 1952 if our normal rate of increase of productive capacity continues and we are afflicted with no major calamity such as befell the prairie provinces this fall. Why not advance Britain enough credit to enable her to buy, and Canadians to sell, all the goods that Canadians can produce in 1952 over and above those goods required to supply our people's needs and enough goods to fill our present commitments to other nations? It will be impossible at the present time to tell just how much that will be, but, whatever the amount may be, why not, almost in a blank cheque sort of way, undertake to advance to Britain enough credit to buy such of those surplus goods as Britain needs? Why not promise to Britain a corresponding amount of credit in each of the years 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956?

If a thing like that were done, immediately you would strengthen the confidence of all producers across Canada. With normal intelligence in the government in the way of guaranteeing prices and other necessities, you would greatly increase production and the productive capacity of Canada. Take hogs as an example. Think of the number of hogs we were producing in 1944. We could produce that number again, and more, and so on through practically the whole list of our agricultural products.

Why not let Britain have these goods on a thirty-year credit basis without interest and with no strings attached, except that there be yearly token payments, until the United Kingdom economy justifies larger continuous payments? It would be understood of course that Britain would use the credit advanced