

If and when the Governments of Canada and the United States agree that methods have been proven that will eliminate the risk of biota transfer, or if the question of biota transfer is agreed to be no longer a matter of concern, then the construction of the Garrison Diversion Unit which will affect waters flowing into Canada may be undertaken providing the following conditions are met:

- (a) Any agreed modifications or other measures required to resolve the inter-basin biota transfer issues are incorporated into the project-

Canada is categorically opposed, as the Hon, Member knows, to those project features defined by the U.S.A. as phase II, and has requested tangible evidence from the U.S.A. that its assurances on that score are in fact credible, bearing in mind the International Joint Commission's recommendation that:

-those portions of the Garrison Diversion Unit which would affect waters flowing into Canada not be built at this time.

Canada proposed the technical-consultative mechanism to the U.S.A. side at the November 21, 1983 consultations. This was an attempt to shift management of the Garrison issue back on track towards mutually agreeable solutions, after a long period of protracted and often interrupted consultations.

Canada has always valued general assurances provided by the United States at the policy level not to construct Garrison features which would affect adversely Canadian waters, and had always welcomed the commitment of successive United States administrations to the principle of consultations. At the same time, however, the Government realized that if it was to be successful in its determination to protect Manitoba's commercial and native fishing interests and prevent the pollution of Hudson Bay drainage basin waters by foreign biota from redirected Missouri River water, then it must fashion some instrument for translating general assurances from the United States into technical assurances and have safeguards built into the specifications of Garrison engineering plans and drawings.

Further to the requirement for a bilateral mechanism at the technical level was the requirement to institutionalize bilateral consultations at the senior officials' level. Canada was seeking above all else a fail-safe mechanism for preventing a recurrence of the Lonetree Dam fait accompli, which in August