

raise the profile of the need to limit the proliferation of light weapons. Three areas are introduced and discussed at length: transparency, oversight, and control.

Transparency efforts have focused on major conventional weapons and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, but provide useful models for similar efforts for light weapons. Dyer and Goldring note several ways in which transparency can be increased with regards to light weapons:

- 1) expanding the Register to include light weapons;
- 2) developing arms registers tailored to regional dynamics;
- 3) opening up national import and export policies to scrutiny;
- 4) encouraging early accessibility to information on prospective transfers;
- 5) requiring transparency of national military spending;
- 6) integrating sources of information (e.g., merge data on government-to-government as well as commercial transfers).

Oversight refers to the process of regulating arms transfers (e.g., bureaucracies, legislatures, and international organizations). Given the relatively low cost of light weapons, these organizations do not track light weapons with the same thoroughness as they do for major systems. Dyer and Goldring emphasize the need to convince the international community of the need to monitor light weapons transfers. Several measures to improve and expand oversight of light weapons transfers are analysed:

- 1) including light weapons in the COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls) successor regime;
- 2) establishing a proscription against selling weapons to countries that violate internationally accepted human rights standards or engage in acts of armed aggression;
- 3) improving national oversight mechanisms;
- 4) enhancing national customs regulations and improving international cooperation among western services involved with monitoring imports and exports of weapons;
- 5) observing commitments under international law.

Control refers to efforts aimed at limiting the quantity or quality of weapons transferred. Such actions must address all aspects of the arms transfer spectrum (i.e., from government-to-government to black market transactions). Several specific options to control weapons proliferation are examined:

- 1) improving domestic gun control;
- 2) eliminating or restricting certain types of weapons (e.g., anti-personnel landmines);
- 3) developing a global regime to eliminate black market military sales;
- 4) supporting regional recipient restraint (e.g., tailor control efforts to regional dynamics);
- 5) creating more effective border controls;
- 6) limiting the supply of surplus weapons;
- 7) strengthening international law;
- 8) investigating technical aspects (e.g., technology which renders a weapon unusable after a certain period of time);
- 9) implementing economic measures (e.g., make aid conditional on participation in the UN Register).

Dyer and Goldring observe that the way the international community responds to conflict determines the options available to it (e.g., embargoes are cosmetic if not enforced). New institutions must be built to replace those of the Cold War. In the meantime, the goal should not be the total elimination of light weapons. It is sufficient to work towards placing the concept on the international security agenda in order that further progress towards restraint can continue. Central to this process is a re-ordering of priorities. Economics should no longer be the primary determinant in arms transfers, but be relegated to the background behind security and humanitarian concerns. Efforts towards this goal would be facilitated by a co-alition of various groups (e.g., physicians, trade unions, peace and environmental groups), each bringing their own perspective to the problem of light weapons.

605. Gamba, Virginia and Jakkie Potgieter. "UNIDIR's Project on Managing Arms During Peace Processes: A Research Summary." A Paper Presented at the BASIC Conference on Light Weapons Proliferation and Opportunities for Control. London: June 30-July 2, 1996.

Gamba and Potgieter argue that "disarmament and weapons management *must be seen* [emphasis in the original] as part of a wider political process aimed at resolving underlying and structural sources of conflict" (p.