

right now.”¹⁰

Predictions of sweeping change, both in technology and especially in the nature of warfare, do not appear to have been entirely borne out as the century ended. The technology of war has evolved, but conventional forces, --air forces, navies and especially armies-- have been used repeatedly, although not in major interstate warfare. More importantly, while the United States did bring its forces home from many foreign bases, they have not stayed home. Indeed, as stressed in this study, one of the key elements driving the RMA is that the United States seeks to continue to project its power abroad. In this regard, Van Creveld's other suggestion that the proliferation of nuclear technology will convince non-Western states of the disutility of large-scale conventional war, does not appear to be the main concern, rather it is that nuclear weapons and other WMDs will be used as counters to the RMA.

Although technological developments are key to predictions made by the RMA, a 1999 study by the RAND Corporation for the United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) suggests that the role of technological change needs to be placed in perspective. This is because, fundamentally, an RMA “involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either *renders obsolete or irrelevant* one or more core competencies of a dominant player or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of warfare, or both.”¹¹ For example, it could be argued that the introduction of the aircraft carrier constituted an RMA as far as naval power was concerned because it undermined the core competency of the dominant naval powers which had been large battleships. The advent of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) shifted the paradigm by creating a dimension of warfare, intercontinental strategic warfare and creating a new competency, the long-range accurate delivery of nuclear weapons. The introduction of the machine gun shifted the paradigm by creating a “new tactical level model for land warfare,” and “rendered obsolete” the competency in being able to “maneuver massed forces in the open.” In some future conflict the employment of “cyberspace-based technologies” by one side against another sufficient to alter the course of the conflict, would be an RMA “since it would create a new core competency (information warfare) in a new dimension of warfare (cyberspace).”¹² This is an important point, since if the RMA is to fundamentally change the nature of warfare, then it must in some sense provide one state or group of states advantages which negate previous advantages, even those held by the state introducing the new weapon.

¹⁰ Ibid, “High Technology and the Transformation of War-Part II,” *Royal United Services Institute Journal* (137) (December 1992). p. 62.

¹¹ Richard O. Hundley, *Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, What can the history of revolutions in military affairs tell us about transforming the U.S. military*, (Santa Monica: National Defense Research Institute, Rand, 1999), p. 9 (emphasis in original).

¹² *Ibid*, pp.12, 20.