

a respectable part of the system; whereas previously, in recent years, it was merely a reprehensible survival of Capitalism.

"As for Soviet external policy, it still presents a mixed pattern of some things that are hopeful and more that remain stubbornly discouraging. There have been some minor concessions and some reassuring words. However, I suggest that nothing in all this gives us cause to believe that basic Soviet objectives in foreign policy have changed, or that Soviet leaders are in fact ready to accept reasonable solutions to major international problems. That is one reason why we are watching so closely the Berlin Conference today.

"The second European development which stands out in the last year is of course the remarkable, and to some people disturbing, recovery of West Germany. While this process has been under way for some time, both in the economic and the political field, the decisive electoral victory of Chancellor Adenauer last September, drew special attention to the progress and the stability of the West German Republic. The people of the Soviet zone of Germany, where an election such as that would never have been permitted by the occupation authorities, nevertheless managed to show their own will for freedom during June of 1953 in courageous demonstrations against the communist regime, and by so doing they exposed once and for all the hollowness of the claim that the Soviet puppet regime could speak for them at home or before the world. And that fact, Mr. Speaker, is worth keeping in mind, particularly at this moment. The Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference may once again pretend that Germany can be united in an all-German Government, formed not by free elections but by merging the present East and West German Governments. Well, we all know what happened to democracy in Poland and Czechoslovakia when Russian communist agents were allowed to share governmental responsibility with genuine democrats. It would be deplorable if that tragic error were repeated in Germany.

#### REVERSE SIDE

"There is of course a reverse side to this medal. The very qualities of energy and discipline which have served the West Germans so well and resulted in their new strength are beginning to arouse concern among some old friends of ours who are also old neighbours of theirs, and it is easy for anyone whose knowledge of European history goes back beyond the last two or three years to understand this concern. Europe is no longer simply an East and a West, with a void left in the centre by the total collapse of Germany in 1945. Once again there is a centre. We have therefore not only the continuing danger of Soviet Imperialism; there is also fear of what many Europeans and others who remember 1914 and 1939 regard as the reviving danger of German ambition and German armed strength. I think we can under-

stand this fear without agreeing with the conclusions which are sometimes drawn from it. But let us assume that there is a basis for it, a reality to the fear. What then is the best method of removing it, to restrain a re-armed and perhaps a reunited Germany from aggression again?

"Well, one method of controlling the menace of German aggressive expansion is the old unhappy one, by which the West joined with the East against an independent armed Germany in Central Europe. Neither in 1914 nor in 1939 was such an alliance effective in preventing war, though that alliance later contributed enormously to Germany's defeat and punishment. The second method, which is new and not yet tried, is to bring Germany into an alliance of West and Central Europe against aggression, an alliance in which European unity can develop for other than defence purposes. And we have that, Mr. Speaker, in the European Defence Community.

"The Canadian Government has already expressed its support for EDC as a method for associating Germany with the European system and with the Atlantic community. Surely the harnessing of German rearmament to a defensive collective purpose would provide the best security for all, east as well as west, from the possible danger that Germany, isolated and with renewed strength in Central Europe, might once again play off east against west and eventually be tempted once more to follow the old policy of defeat and attack, subdue and occupy.

#### GERMANY

"I do not think myself that a solution of this European problem, which is also an Atlantic problem and therefore a Canadian problem, can be found in Germany's disarmament and neutralization, or indeed in Germany's rearmament and neutralization. That solution might of course and indeed does appeal to the Communists for obvious reasons. It would mean the exclusion of Germany from the developing European system, and it would release her from any responsibility for sharing in collective defence against aggression. In any event, as I see it, such a solution, even if it were desirable - and it certainly has its appeal - is simply not practicable. Surely it is unrealistic to base any permanent policy on the disarmament, the control and the neutralization of 65 million Germans inside their present boundaries. Surely it is better to bind Germany not only to the rest of Europe but to the Atlantic Community. I know it will be argued that the Russians and their satellites will simply never agree to this and therefore will never agree to any unification of Germany on these terms. Nevertheless, this is the policy that has been accepted as best and wisest in the present circumstances by the German Republic, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, by ourselves and by many other coun-

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