2. Other Potential Candidates for the Sinai Model

Only four cases have been outlined above as potential candidates for the application of the Sinai model. Other *prima facie* candidates that deserve further study include various borders in Central America in the context of the Contadora process, Northern Ireland, the Western Sahara, South Africa/Namibia, India/Pakistan and Iran/Iraq[64] as part of a postwar settlement.

3. Potential Impediments to Applying the Sinai Model

It is clear from the foregoing discussion of these cases that the ideal conditions under which the Sinai model was successfully employed may not be fully replicated in other settings. A number of potential impediments to transposing the model directly can be identified:

- In regional settings where more than two parties are engaged in managing a dispute, the task of establishing a verification system suited to the security needs of all the parties could become much more difficult to co-ordinate and implement, especially where sub-national groups and guerrillas might resist any new agreement. The prospects for success may depend on how well outside groups and states are initially integrated into the negotiation process over new disengagement arrangements. In short, where several parties are involved, incentives to co-operate may not be shared equally by all. Some actors may simply want the security benefits derived from a verification system (i.e., the early warning detection and deterrence functions) without wanting the long-term objective of confidence-building and improvement of relations.[65]

- To be effectively implemented in other regions the verification system must be flexible so as to accommodate an appropriate mix of verification technology and manpower in accordance with changing political requirements over time. A lack of

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[64] While the seven-year-old war between Iran and Iraq at present shows no signs of abating, it is worthwhile, nevertheless, to anticipate the kind of verification regime that might be most appropriate for verifying a ceasefire and ultimately a disengagement agreement requiring zones of thinned out forces. Clearly, assistance for some portion of the verification system would have to be provided by third parties from outside the region who might then co-ordinate their activities with the Gulf Council on Co-operation. For example, a designated UN peacekeeping mission could establish and operate observation posts and early warning watch stations in the area surrounding such critical strategic points as Basra. Given recent US difficulties in reconstituting a dialogue with Iran, it might be most appropriate if members of the neutral and non-aligned countries took the lead in contributing to the verification of postwar agreements. In this connection, a recent Swedish proposal (July 1985) may suggest one possible approach in the Iran-Iraq context. The Swedes have called for the creation of an Arms Control and Conflict Observation Satellite (ACCOS) to be operated by a number of neutral and non-aligned nations. According to the proposal, "the mission of this system should be not only to monitor arms control arrangements but also collect information and data particularly on the crisis sensitive areas in order to make it possible to avert the crisis developing into a major conflict." The data collected by the satellite could be made available to a consultative commission composed of various members of the Gulf Council on Co-operation. For further details of the Swedish proposal see Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibomi Sakata (editors), *Satellites For Arms Control and Crisis Monitoring*, (SIPRI), (Oxford: Oxford University, 1987), pp. 41-43.

[65] The classic purposes of verification include detection, deterrence and confidence-building. In terms of detection, the parties are interested in finding possible violations of an agreement and providing timely warning of any threat to security arising under an agreement to strengthen deterrence. Parties to an agreement need to forestall violations by increasing the likelihood of detection and preventing schemes of circumvention. Confidence-building, the third purpose of verification, refers to the development of trust in the viability of the new security arrangements. While it is questionable whether any of these purposes can be conceived as independent ends in themselves, it may be argued that in acute conflict settings, trust-building is given a somewhat lower priority. In other cases, however, it may be more appropriate to see the various functions of verification as interdependent and cumulative. As Richard Darilek notes: ". . . one's ability to detect improves with the ability to deter and the ability to do both — that is both detect and deter — is what actually produces the confidence." See Richard E. Darilek, "Political Aspects of Verification: Arms Control in Europe", in *A Proxy For Trust: Views On The Verification Issue in Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations* (Ottawa: Carleton International Proceedings, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, 1985), p. 65.