chemical weapons, the progress on destruction of the declared stockpiles, and whether facilities and chemicals in Schedules 2 and 3 are not used for purposes prohibited by the Convention. After all weapons have been destroyed, routine monitoring would be confined mainly to the latter function.

Routine monitoring of stockpiles would involve the collection and processing of accounting data from storage sites, and the operation and maintenance of some type of security systems as supplements to the inspection regime. The data, periodically updated, would be part of the central data base, which would be used to monitor compliance. The identification of substances stored at various sites would be done primarily by portable or transportable analytical instruments designed to identify any of the declared chemicals at a given site.

Monitoring of Schedule 2 and 3 declarations would place on the Organization demands substantially different from those for Schedule 1. The number of states declaring the possession and destruction of chemical weapons would be a fraction of those making declarations related to chemicals on Schedules 2 and 3. Furthermore, the total number of facilities and the number of chemicals involved in Schedule 1 declarations would be small compared to facilities and chemicals covered by Schedules 2 and 3. At this time, there are no data on the number of facilities world-wide that would be affected by the declarations required for Schedule 2 and 3. The primary impact of this number would be on the data storage requirements at the headquarters of the Organization. Data processing procedures would not be substantially affected, although their might be an indirect impact on the speed and throughput specifications of the central processing unit. The current language of the rolling text requires annual reports for Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals; even if inspections occur more frequently than once a year, time intervals of weeks or months might elapse between successive data sets. The slowest of the present generation minicomputers should be able to process the data well within the required time intervals.

Routine compliance monitoring of Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals would entail the verification of declarations pertaining to these chemicals. These declaration would identify facilities, chemicals and quantities. The analytical information required to confirm that a declared chemical was present at the associated facility would be minimal, since the operator would have no incentive to declare the presence of a controlled chemical, if the chemical was not present. Most information of interest to the Organization would be quantities produced, processed, traded, and consumed. If these data are to be used for constructing materials balance within a closed boundary, elaborate processing of data would be involved. Thus, the size of the central processing facility might become substantial.