

members of the Security Council parties to the convention.

This machinery should be seen primarily as an earnest of the effectiveness of the future convention, ensuring compliance with the principle of not endangering the security of any of the parties.

A very important problem is the elaboration of a procedure, acceptable to all the States parties to the future convention, for the adoption by the consultative committee and its subsidiary organ of decisions relating to substantive questions. Many far-reaching proposals of every kind have been submitted on this subject, but no reply has yet been forthcoming. This is not surprising, since the question really is complex. Yet, in our opinion there is a solution — as in many other questions which have arisen in the process of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons, it lies in a realistic view of matters. We proceed from the basis that the best means of adopting decisions is by consensus. However, if it is not possible to reach a consensus within strictly stipulated periods, reckoned in some cases in days and in others in hours, then, in our opinion, there is only one practical — I repeat, practical — possibility: to bring to the notice of the party or parties the individual views on a given question of the members of the consultative committee or the executive council. The opinions of States, set out in the manner established by international law, would together constitute for many States a serious political factor which it would not be possible to ignore. As a last resort, it would always be possible to use other procedures, which would be provided for in the convention.

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Article I spells out the obligations of the nuclear Powers with a view to preventing non-nuclear States from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The question which has been asked over the past 16 years is simple and remains unanswered: how can proliferation be prevented if some Powers, Parties or non-Parties to the Treaty, retain and utilize their right to continue developing, stock-piling and disseminating their nuclear weapons all over the world? Resolution 2028 stated that "the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit nuclear and non-nuclear Powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form" (stress added). What became of that principle, which was once supported by all, including the nuclear Powers which are now Parties to the treaty? Furthermore, is the non-transfer of weapons, or the transfer of their control, verifiable in any way? What became of the principle of an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations in relation to verification? Verification of compliance with the main objective of the treaty is non-existent when it touches on the actions and interests of the nuclear Powers, which are not, in any way, accountable to the other Parties. Concerning the transfer of nuclear weapons, one cannot but evoke their massive deployment in Europe by the super-Powers outside their own boundaries. To corroborate the conformity of such deployment with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties must count only on unilateral declarations of the nuclear Powers concerned, to the effect that it retains the control over those weapons. By contrast, even the mere transfer of equipment for research reactors for civil purposes to a non-nuclear Party is covered by a stringent system of verification. In other words, nuclear weapons are freely transported and deployed wherever and whenever the super-Powers so decide, while the search for nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by any other country is severely scrutinized.

The super-Powers went even further into their unconstrained freedom to dispose of their nuclear arsenals and, through unilateral interpretations, they will be prepared, if necessary, to relinquish control of nuclear weapons to their allies in case of conflict. In