2. Naive assumptions about the psychological dynamics of "Confidence-Building" as well as the disruptive and constraining effects of "cognitive processes" on information processing and misperception.

The first general generic flaw had to do with the way in which the Soviet Union was treated analytically in the Confidence-Building literature. We noted that the *perceived fact* of increasingly offensive and potent Soviet conventional military capabilities (relative to NATO forces) was a matter of serious concern to many Western analysts and policy makers. This perception was an inescapable fact of life *virtually independent of the objective determination that Soviet and WTO forces did or did not constitute a significant conventional military threat.* As a consequence of this "reality", it was argued that no discussion of Confidence-Building Measures ought simply to begin with the apparent assumption that Soviet military intentions were essentially benign and misunderstood, and then suggest ways in which presumably unwarranted concerns about the character of Soviet policy and capabilities could be addressed through the use of CBMs. *Whether or not Soviet policy and capabilities are essentially benign, non-threatening and misunderstood is a matter that ought to be established – or at least discussed critically – within the Confidence-Building literature.* Because there are equally plausible "benign" and "malevolent" models of Soviet military capabilities and intentions, the "benign view" should not be the only one to animate discussions of Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures. The study illustrated this point by briefly exploring four contrasting images or models of Soviet military capabilities, concerns, and intentions. The point in sketching out these "alternative images" – simplified models of Soviet perspectives – was fairly straightforward. Confidence-Building as a process and, more specifically, Confidence-Building Measures, have *differential possibilities for success depending upon the "true" nature of Soviet military doctrine, capabilities and a host of other elements having to do with Soviet foreign and domestic policies.* Only one of the four alternative images discussed in this study appears to be favourable for the production of useful Confidence-Building Measures. If we

looked at the full range of plausible images in greater detail, we would almost certainly discover a similarly uneven picture. Some images would support modest or ambitious Confidence-Building Measures but many would not.

An underlying analytic failure closely associated with the first fundamental generic flaw is the apparent absence within Confidence-Building thinking of any sophisticated model of WTO-NATO policy interaction. There is rarely any sense of *how* the complex policies of the two alliances interact with each other in causal terms. Sometimes there appears to be a vaguely discernible underlying assumption that some kind of action-reaction interaction, aggravated by "worst-case" planning, drives the two alliances into a progressively more alienated and antagonistic relationship. At other times, there appears to be no interest in or awareness of the importance of understanding the WTO-NATO relationship and its role in defining the limits of and need for Confidence-Building Measures. If the dynamics of that relationship are largely autonomous and intra-national, for instance, the possibility of using CBMs to control or otherwise influence the military and political relationship will be seriously impaired. Although they might well be crucial to any understanding of Confidence-Building Measures in Europe, these notions are seldom examined and virtually never made a central feature of analysis.

Although not explored at any length in the study, there is also a very troubling and related failure in Confidence-Building thinking to place questions about Soviet military policy and the "threat" it actually poses in the larger context of what "causes" or determines that policy (i.e. to what degree Soviet military doctrine and capabilities are the product of interactive and reactive influences – such as the nature of NATO doctrine and capabilities – and to what degree they are the product of unilateral or purely intra-national factors). *It makes little sense to advance ideas about Eurocentric Confidence-Building Measures when the basic nature of Soviet and NATO military postures and policies and the degree to which they actually interact with each other are so poorly grasped.* To divorce considerations of