

a renewal of conflict by land or by sea. It is remarkable that so moderate a doctrine should even require defence, and still more astonishing that it should encounter resistance. We have rejoiced to see this simple logic upheld in this debate by governments of renowned [sic.] maturity in international affairs and of irreproachable devotion to the cause of the United Nations. This very morning, the dangers of what has been called a "unilateral and limited approach" have been referred to in varying degrees of emphasis by the representatives of Costa Rica, France, The Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland.

Nor does a single day pass without impressive endorsement of this position in the great organs and tribunals of opinion throughout the world. As the days go by, the consensus of opinion grows in favour of a course of action in the Strait of Tiran and in Gaza which would block the path to avoidable tragedy and disaster.

Mr. Fawzi, in turn, expressed the Egyptian point of view:

When I came to this rostrum at the beginning of the present debate, I spoke only for a few moments. I intend to do likewise today. This is because the issue before the Assembly is incisively clear: it is the matter of Israel's withdrawal from territory which through aggression it occupied after its attack on Egypt on 29 October 1956.

The issue remains, as I submitted to the Assembly in my previous intervention, for the Assembly to decide whether or not aggression shall be allowed to reign, to rule, to decide any issues and to bear fruit for the aggressors. It is well known that confusing the issue is a common procedure resorted to by those who are aware of the precariousness of their position. This suffices to explain why some delegations, particularly the delegation of Israel and two or three others—luckily, not more—have tried to take us into by-ways and into side matters which have absolutely nothing to do with the present issue. Indeed, we have begun to feel that a famous procedure known as the filibuster is beginning to grow in this Assembly; I hope that it will be nipped in the bud.

The vote on the draft resolution showed 74 countries in favour, with two against (Israel and France), and two abstaining (Costa Rica and Cuba).

When the Assembly again turned to the Middle East question on January 28 it had before it as yet no draft resolutions, but did have two lengthy documents for discussion: an Israeli Aide-Mémoire on the Israel position on the Sharm al-Shaikh area and the Gaza strip (A/3511), and the Secretary-General's report on compliance with the resolution of January 19 which called for withdrawal of Israeli forces (A/3512).

The theme of the first document was to link the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egyptian intentions toward Israel generally, and in particular to Israel's interests in the Gaza strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. The Israeli Government, it was argued, had secured no answers to questions asked on such matters, from which it was deduced that "Egypt intends to maintain her belligerent policy toward Israel on land, sea and in the air." Positive suggestions were then made. In the Sharm al-Shaikh area UNEF should take the place of Israeli forces and see that freedom of navigation was maintained. In the Gaza strip Israel would supply administrative and police units (but not military forces). UNEF would not be useful in the area as it could neither provide administration nor "prevent a recrudescence of fedayeen activities."

On withdrawal, the Secretary-General's report showed that on January 22 there remained Israeli forces in two areas: in and outside the western boundary of the Gaza strip; and on the western side of the Gulf of Aqaba and as far south as the Gulf of Suez. The second, and longer, part of the report is an examination of the limits and principles of United Nations action, and of