

Regimental committee—Capt. Snelgrove, Cobourg; Capt. Bonnycastle, Campbellford; and Lieuts. Floyd, Cobourg; Russ, Brighton; Wilson, Colborne; and Fowlds, Hastings. Rifle committee—Capt. Hamilton, Campbellford; Capt. Bonnycastle, Campbellford; Capt. Birdsall, Birdsall; Lieut. Givan, Campbellford, and Lieut. Fowlds, Hastings.

Col. Rogers announced that Capt. H. J. Snelgrove, commanding No. 1 Company, Cobourg, would be appointed on the regimental staff as Quartermaster; that Lieut. Ed. Campbell would be promoted to be captain of No. 1 Company, and that H. W. Laird would be recommended to the position of lieutenant in Mr. Campbell's place. It was intimated that several other official changes and promotions would probably take place before the Battalion marches to camp at Kingston next June.

The business of the meeting concluded, the officers adjourned to the dining room where a delicious dinner was served in elegant style by host Hicks.

A more successful military rendezvous has not been held in connection with the 40th Batt. since its establishment.

It was decided to re-engage the Brighton band, which has 15 pieces. There were a number of applications, among them the Coldsprings band.

Military Books and Magazines.

Two views of Waterloo.

In a work "The Campaign of Waterloo: a Military History," by J. C. Ropes, published by Putnam & Co., New York, the author maintains that Napoleon's arrangements were perfectly designed and should have ensured success. If his general had executed his orders well, the Prussian Army would have been destroyed and Wellington paralysed, if not defeated.

Blucher's arrangements were, he says, very defective, while Napoleon's tactics were immensely superior. The author considers the failures back of Blucher and Wellington the one on Wavre and the other on Waterloo, as very bad strategy. This double movement exposed Wellington to crushing defeat on the 17th, and the author of the work quoted approves of Napoleon's view, that his enemies should have retreated on Brussels, concentrating their combined armies, for in that case they would have opposed an infinitely superior force to that of the Emperor.

A series of accidents saved the Allies from what should have been their ruin. It is stated that the remissness of Ney, Soult, and Grouchy on the 17th prevented a victory for the French.

A different view is held by General John Watts de Peyster, the author of "Waterloo: the Campaign and the Battle," a work published by the same firm as the one previously alluded to. "Instead," he writes, "of Napoleon launching a column of crushing weight against the English left, and interposing decisively between Wellington and Blucher; or instead of making a vigorous demonstration against the British centre and a less vigorous one against the British right, Napoleon attacked in force what was about the strongest point of Wellington's line (the right), thus assailing a prepared and strengthened stronghold with Infantry alone, losing first and last in the course of the attempt 5,000 men." It is conceded by de Peyster that Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign was an invalid, physically unfit for the part he undertook to play, and that pity for emasculated greatness should condone many failings. No one will be likely to dispute the assertion that "a man is not fit for vigorous thought who is sitting a-straddle on red-hot coals

sprinkled with corrosive acid."

Mr. Ropes, however, and those who agree with him, do not concede that Napoleon was physically unfit to command at Waterloo. Indeed, there is no need for such concession if the Emperor's arrangements were perfectly designed and failed by reason only of the remissness of his subordinates. At the same time, General de Peyster does not admit that Wellington won the battle of Waterloo. Such an assertion, in his view, would be a perversion of terms. "It is the truth (and that is glory enough for him and his troops) that they held their own so long against such terrible odds. Blucher decided, and therefore, technically as well as virtually, won the battle, and gleaned as well as gathered the fruits."

In fine, General de Peyster considers the views of the author of the "Campaign of Waterloo" erroneous, and sums up as follows:—The generalship displayed by Bonaparte at Waterloo was in many respects stupidity itself in spite of the praise bestowed on it by Thiers and other writers."

The Cordite Case.

The cordite case came to a conclusion Wednesday, with judgment for the defendants, the chemists of the Government. The Nobel Company had a peculiarly skilled as well as a very powerful advocate in Mr. Fletcher Moulton, but he failed to establish his plea of infringement of patent to the satisfaction of Mr. Justice Romer. It was a case in which much the same results in the manufacture of a powerful explosive were produced by two different methods, the method that had priority being Mr. Nobel's. From the evidence it appeared that in 1888 Mr. Nobel, whom the Plaintiff Company now represent, took out a patent for the manufacture of ballistite, a smokeless explosive susceptible of granulation, from nitro-glycerine and soluble nitro-cellulose. At the date of this patent, two forms of nitro-cellulose were before the scientific world.

The one was soluble; the other was insoluble. The former, commonly called collodion cotton, or collodion gun-cotton, was used for photographic and surgical purposes. The latter, known as gun-cotton, was used for explosive purposes. It was more violent and more dangerous in proximity or connection with heat than soluble nitro-cellulose. Mr. Nobel employed soluble nitro-cellulose as the basis of manufacture of ballistite, and thereby arrived at an invention which, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Romer, who tried the present case, was useful and meritorious, and a proper subject-matter for letters patent. In the preparation of cordite—which, as every one is aware, resulted from the labours of the Explosive Committee and its individual members—insoluble nitro-cellulose was one of the bases of manufacture; and—apart from the question to which we have already referred, whether Mr. Nobel's patent of 1888 was valid—the single issue with which Mr. Justice Romer had to deal was, whether the use of insoluble nitro-cellulose had been claimed by Mr. Nobel in his specification, so as to render the manufacture of cordite by the defendant, Dr. Anderson, of Woolwich, an infringement of the ballistite patent. Although the action was nominally brought against Dr. Anderson, the real defendants were the Government. Both parties had the aid of the highest legal that scientific skill. The case has, therefore, been contested under eminently favorable conditions. But Mr. Justice Romer, without reserving judg-

ment according to the usual practice in heavy patent actions, he'd, without hesitation, that Mr. Nobel had confined his claim to the manufacture of ballistite from soluble nitro-cellulose and that the manufacture of cordite from insoluble nitro-cellulose was, therefore, no infringement of his invention. Dr. Anderson, representing the War Office, therefore won his case.

The Hundred and Ten Ton Gun.

It is now twelve years since the first 110-ton gun was manufactured in England, and during that period forty of these monster weapons have been produced. Four of them have been sent to Italy, and two went down with the Victoria. It is easy to understand that such guns are an expensive means of defense, not only in the actual cost of the weapon and its ammunition, but also in the size of the ships required to carry them. The best ordnance experts calculate the life of the 110-ton gun to be from 75 to 80 rounds with full charges. These guns are fired with slow-burning cocoa powder, the name cocoa being derived from the brown colour of the powder. It is shaped in hexagonal prisms, this being the most convenient form of packing, and 10,000 of these prisms are needed to make a full charge for this monster gun. Each prism is pierced with a hole in the centre to give ready access to the flame and ensure an equable ignition. For most of the large naval guns the powder charge is made up of four cartridges, but owing to the extraordinary weight of the 110-ton gun charge (960-lbs.) it is divided into eight cartridges of 120 lbs. each. To load the gun it is necessary to bring it to its extreme elevation, and then eleven distinct operations are gone through before the weapon is ready to be discharged by electricity. It takes two minutes and a half to load and fire the gun. The projectile used when forts or ships are attacked weighs 1,800 lbs. or about 200 lbs. less than a ton. In firing the gun against a body of men or a flotilla of boats a steel cylinder enclosing 2,300 four-ounce bullets would be used. As soon as the shrapnel bursts the bullets go flying on, the spinning of the shell, caused by the rifled grooves of the gun, spreading them over a large area.

A Lament from the Rear Rank.

"Close up, rear rank." That old refrain,
Bangs in my tortured ears again.
I spread my gait, and glue my nose
Fast into my file-leader's clothes.
His collar-button I inspect,
And pour my breathings down his neck.
I hear him grumble, growl, and blow,
And beg his pardon soft and low.
I wonder as I peg along,
Unseen, unnoticed in the throng,
If I will ever rank achieve,
And wear some chevrons on my sleeve.
And how 'twill seem to step out, free
To swear at fellows under me.
I stumble—There it goes again!
"Rear rank, close up"—for me, 'tis plain.

THE COUNTERSIGN.