

spiritual affairs by a series of disruptions which have reduced the Establishment, as still Erastianised by the ecclesiastical Acts of 1848 and the judicial and legislative decrees that preceded or followed these, to a mere minority. By suffering for conscience sake alone have the majority bought a freedom which, however, neither Parliament nor the Courts have yet explicitly recognized. Meanwhile the new Empire of Germany has been forced to try its hand at a solution, by the audacity of Ultramontanism, but Prince Bismark has only gone far to the opposite extreme of Cesarism. With clearer eye, the successors of Cavour, in Italy, have been scanning the prospect, and they have legislatively arrived at the nearest approach, yet made in Europe, to a definition of the independent and co-ordinate spheres of the State and the Church. So far has Italy gone in the face of the Ultramontane pretensions of the dethroned Papacy, yet, unlike Germany, so restrained has it been in recognising the legitimate action of the spiritual power in purely spiritual things, that Scottish Christian men have envied its Government and held up its legislation for imitation."

In the record of its doings during the hundred years of its existence, it stands to the credit of the United States, that it (in the language of an English legal authority) "*has solved the problem which lies before Europe.*" In the United States, the State has been during a century separate from the Church and independent of it; and yet the legal position of the Church, as disclosed in the records of the law, is one of extraordinary energy, dignity, and independence."

It is interesting indeed—as interesting as any material exhibit at Philadelphia, in the great centennial year—to study the solution of this problem by American jurisprudence; the sentiments of the old Puritans and Covenanters tempered by the worldly wisdom of an educated democracy in a new and mighty continent. Here is therefore a brief summary, as presented by a recent reviewer, of the eight principles governing the relation of Church and State in the United States:—

"First of all, then, 'American law acknowledges a jurisdiction in the Church; leaves all Church questions (questions of worship, doctrine, discipline, and membership) to the decision of the Church itself; and refuses to review these decisions.' This differs little from the decision of the Privy Council in the case of '*Long v. the Bishop of Cape Town,*' where there is no Church established by law. The English law, however, will not go farther than sustain Church jurisdiction where it exists, while the American Courts assume that it exists as inherent in every Church till the contrary is proved! But (2) 'American law claims for itself complete and exclusive control not only over the life, liberty, and goods of all Churchmen, but over all Church property and funds.' This strikes at the root of Ultramontane and priestly domination over the civil power. (4) 'But, in order to decide purely civil questions of person, goods, and estate, the law necessarily deals with innumerable religious questions and Church relations.' Where property depends on differences of doctrine or discipline, these are to the judge questions of civil right. American law refuses to deal with religious questions directly, as such or to review Church dealings with them, but the interest of