

ject to introduce incidentally. Such resources, whatever their true value, must ever be secondary to those furnished by British blood. Those at the Cape can only be fairly estimated when the present war is closed. In Canada the proportion of native races to British is very small, but it may be fitting here to quote from an address to the Queen from the Chiefs of Six Nations, "assembled at their council fire," during the Crimean War. "Great Mother, they wrote, your children of the Six Nations have always been faithful and active allies of your Crown, and the ancestors of your Red children never failed to assist in the battles of your illustrious ancestors."

The aggregate value of exports and imports of British colonies and possessions is something like £300,000,000. The value of exports and imports of the United Kingdom was but some £60,000,000, while last year it was £655,000,000, therefore the colonies alone have five times and we have ten times a greater stake in the sea than we had in the year succeeding Trafalgar. The navy estimates for 1805 were £1,493,843; in 1814 they were £22,000,000, or a little over one fourth of the value of our exports and imports of that year. The value of exports and imports of Australian colonies alone is now equal to that of England and France together in 1802—the year of peace of Amiens. Such facts as these sufficiently indicate that the burden of protection of our common commerce in war must be shared and justly distributed according to the capacity of the several joints in the Imperial back, they point unmistakably first, to federal naval positions, and next to a federal fleet and a federal movable army to support that fleet.

If the Empire has deliberately accepted the principle that each portion of it should be independently responsible for its territorial defence, no matter whether the population or internal resources of each are sufficient for the purpose or not, it has accepted a principle which renders it liable in war to subjugation in detail, unless the fallacy be assumed that the fleet of the United Kingdom can everywhere prevent any hostile attack exceeding in power means of isolated local defence. More than this, it risks the command of the sea, without which territorial defence in the United Kingdom means starvation, and in the colonies ruin. I venture to think the colonies have never been asked a question in the matter, and have simply accepted this principle of "domestic defence" because they were left no choice but to adopt it. They are loyal, and they are true, and though they must each and all, except Canada, acknowledge military weakness, they trust implicitly to one of two things—first, that war may not come until time has made them strong, second, that if it does come before they are ready, they trust to the statesmen of England to provide for every deficiency, and to cover every defect they look at them, in short, to do "the rest." Now, it is just these very deficiencies, it is just these very defects, it is, in short, "the rest" of Imperial defence that the statesmen of England cannot provide for without the spontaneous pressure of hearty, willing and practical co-operation of the colonies. They require watching and urging on, and they would not be human if they did not.

The people of the United Kingdom would, I believe, spend their last shilling, and fight their last man, to preserve the Empire intact, and would prepare to do so, and to take their full share of Imperial duty in defence, if they only knew how, if they could only grapple with that "rest," which the colonies look to the statesmen of England to do.

It is for Home and Colonial Legislatures, it is for England's sons all over the world to make their voices heard on this matter. We of this generation are the pioneers of the next. When all Europe is an armed camp, and when one single power like Germany, which had but one corvette and two small gunboats in 1848, bids fair to be soon the third great naval power of the world, we cannot go unarmed. We push to the front home and colonial statesmen to warn us of dangers and difficulties ahead, they are the scouts of our history yet to be written, and the days of consolidating power they must not be blind.

We can hear behind us the unmeasured tread of a host of old and young British nations, whose common path we are prepare

to make plain, and to render safe. We see before us tangled masses of confused systems, which we must do our best to clear away. We are warned of the dangers of our path by the whitened bones of empires which have gone before and perished.

But through the sunshine of peace, or through the darkness and gloom of war, our clear duty and our only hope is still to advance shoulder to shoulder, helping the weak and cheering on the strong, until we have prepared for those who come after us a safe camping ground on the shores of a great future. Then, and not till then, can we take the rest of the weary, confident that so far as in us lies, we have done our part to ensure that our Empire shall remain one and indivisible "till wars shall have ceased in all the world."

(To be continued.)

Africa.

(FROM A MILITARY CORRESPONDENT.)

CAMP, SIKUKUNI'S TOWN, Dec. 2nd, 1879.

Nothing could have gone off with a more complete and dramatic success than the expedition against Sikukuni. To the last the chief bled us defiance without giving a hint that he was at all affected by the gathering forces round him. To the last he used his strong position and his well armed followers, so as to take the best advantage of the ground they knew so well, and have hitherto defended so successfully. Steadily the storm gathered around him and exactly on the appointed day—as I have always named it in my letters to you for weeks past—Nov. 25th, it burst on his devoted head from all sides, shattering his defences to pieces, and breaking up forever his whole power.

The first fighting against Sikukuni's people took place on the morning of Nov. 23rd, when a fortified kraal was attacked, which lies on the mountain side, about 20 miles from the chief town. It was attacked by Ferreira's horse and the natives of the Toutsapaleeny district, under the orders of the Native Commissioner, Mr. Dahl. The latter is a Dane by birth, and has seen service in the American war, and in the Danish war of '81. His plucky leading brought up a sufficient number of the natives to the front to carry through the direct attack on this position. Meantime, Ferreira's men having ridden up as close to the hill as it was possible to go on horseback, dismounted and scrambled up the place on foot. The Basutos clung to the rocks and crannies obstinately for some time, and then betook themselves to their caves. The cave fighting is always an unpleasant kind of work, from the fact that it is impossible to tell when they have been cleared out, and that our own men are shot long after all apparent resistance has ended. Thus Ferreira's Sergeant-Major, a man on whom he greatly relied, was standing on the top talking to some officers, long after all parts of the Kraal hill had been occupied, he stooped down to draw out a skin which he saw at the mouth of one of the caves, and was immediately shot dead. However, though a good many men, natives and colonial troops together were wounded from the awkward nature of the work to be done, the place was taken by the well-combined movements of Dahl to the front and Ferreira to the flank, and the day, though small in scale, was an excellent prelude to what was to follow.

The day following this success, Major Carrington was pushed on with an advance guard, lightly equipped, to seize the ground to be occupied by the main force prior to the attack upon Sikukuni's town. By the afternoon of Nov. 27th all the mixed forces under Colonel Baker Russell's immediate orders, had arrived in position. These comprised the 21st and 84th Regiments, a body of natives trained to work four mountain guns, under command of Captain Knox, R.A., some 300 to 400 mounted men, consisting of a detachment of the 91st about 40 strong, under Lieut. O'Grady, and of various small corps formed in the Colony, under the command respectively of Major Carrington and Commandant Ferreira, with various native tribes numbering in all about 4,000. These were encamped that night (Nov. 27th) along a stream which runs down the valley, on one side of which extends the arm of the Leulu Mountain, occupied by Sikukuni's stronghold. On the further side of the arm of this mountain, from the camp thus placed, lay the masses of our allies, the Swazis, 8,000 strong. These men had their own native Commander-in-Chief, but were under the general control of Capt. McLeod, the agent attached to them. Two companies of the 80th and two of the 84th were sent with them to support them. The whole force on that side of the attack was under Major Bushman's orders.

The position to be attacked the following morning extends along one side of a valley which indents into the Leulu Mountains in a south-westerly direction on their northern side. Sikukuni's town lies very nearly due north of the camp. The "town" is a great mass of huts fenced round by wattled enclosures extended all along the foot of the hill opposite the camp, and up the smaller valleys which cut into that side, and in particular up two deep clefts that ran back for half a mile or more into the mountain. In front of the central portion of the town and of this cleft, but still on the further side of the stream and somewhat to the right front of the camp, a small precipitous detached hill, known as "the fighting Coppelie." The whole of this side of the mountain, and the whole of the fighting Coppelie, was one vast system of rocky masses interspersed with concealed caves, with stone walls built across all the approaches, behind which, as well as in the caves, the defenders were known to be lying. The stone walls or "scances," as the Boers call them, were built of large boulders, and the defenders had their several stations assigned them by mats placed at the points that gave them the best command of the ground in front of them.

The plan of attack was as follows: The Swazis, and the white contingent with them, between whom and us now lay the moun-