

reply to questions reported in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 534. I assume Halifax's instructions have been communicated to you from London.

On assumption of unsatisfactory Japanese reply concerning troop movements to Indo-China, President left Halifax with definite impression he would join in simultaneous warning to Japan that if she used Indo-China as a base for further aggression she would do so at her peril. President made it clear he would give *armed* support to the British in the event of attack on Kra Isthmus. Halifax feels sure the President will give armed support in the event of attack elsewhere in Thailand accompanied by British occupation of Isthmus.

President suggested British should convey private message to Thai Government to the effect that they would enter Thai territory if Japanese did so, but not otherwise. He also suggested public statement that British had no intention of aggression against Thailand but wished only to see Thai independence preserved.

I have now seen text of document given to Japanese November 26th. It conforms to description in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 523,¹ and its acceptance would involve complete reversal of Japanese foreign policy. [Ends.]

1409.

28-C(s)

Le ministre aux États-Unis au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
Minister in United States to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 547

Washington, December 5, 1941

MOST IMMEDIATE. MOST SECRET. Following from Wrong. Begins. Most Secret. My telegram No. 545 of December 4th. President told Halifax last night that United States would join in warning to Japan against further aggression, warning includes attack on Thailand, Malaya, or the Netherlands East Indies. He was dubious about including attack on the Burma Road from Indo-China which London had suggested. This would be different from a new Japanese aggression. He must also base his case on defence grounds, and it would be difficult to convince domestic opinion that attack on the Burma Road endangered defence of the United States. He suggested warning should be delivered in Tokyo separately and in different language, but all within 24 hours, by the United States, United Kingdom, and The Netherlands. He would prefer United States to act first.

He had, however, received indirect communication from Kurusu suggesting that the situation was not yet hopeless and direct appeal to the Emperor might possibly lead to negotiations on a new basis. President did not think this important, but will decide today whether to accept suggestion after Japanese reply has been received to questions asked on December 2nd. If the message is sent to the Emperor, warning mentioned above should be deferred until the Emperor has chance to reply.

¹ Document 1391.