

lating them at all and that they now carry the consensus of 35 countries and the commitment of our political leaders.

The Final Act reaches into the future. Perhaps two years is not long enough to assess its impact fairly. But two years is long enough to have identified the impediments to better progress. Public interest in all our countries is focused on Belgrade and those who are most serious about the Final Act are also those who expect the most from our deliberations. How best can we approach the task that has been delegated to us?

In the Canadian view, there is an inherent logic to our agenda. The first step is to proceed to a careful and objective review of the current state of implementation of the Final Act. To prepare for such a review, all of us will have drawn up our inventories and compiled our statistics. But the review, in the end, is a political matter, not an exercise for statisticians. What matters is what the statistics mean. After all, many of us started from very different positions in respect of the principles and provisions of the Final Act. What seems important to us is to see how close we have come to meeting the objectives on which we agreed in that document.

By proceeding in this way, we shall be better able to measure the gap that still separates promise from performance. Only when that has been done can we seriously turn our attention to new proposals. We see such proposals as designed not to rewrite the Final Act, which is not within our mandate, but to deepen our collective commitment to its purposes and to improve the quality of our performance.

The Final Act is a balanced document. If it were not balanced, it would not have commanded the assent of the 35 countries assembled here. The Canadian Government, therefore, regards itself as being committed to all parts of the Final Act and it intends to see all parts implemented in equal measure.

But public opinion in Canada focuses unequally on the Final Act. It does so because the different parts of the Final Act are different in their relevance to the concerns and priorities of Canadians. And it does so because Canadians have their own perception of what a policy of *détente*, practised conscientiously, should imply. In essence, Canadians will assess such a policy by one simple test, and that is whether, as a consequence of supporting their Government's policy of *détente*, they are living in a safer and more humane world. How does the course we charted at Helsinki stand up to such a test?

We are bound to admit that, in the matter of improving security, the provisions of the Final Act are modest. The modesty of our achievement was recognized at the time because there is no other chapter in the Final Act in which our heads of government gave us greater latitude for future progress. But modest or not, we should not underrate the contribution that these confidence-building measures can make to a more stable and predictable environment in an area that remains the greatest area of armed confrontation — that is, Central Europe. We have gained experience in the operation of these measures over the past two years. We are hopeful that, without going beyond the intent of the Final Act, we may be able to refine their application and broaden their practice.

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