

and the actual holding of the meeting, reducing the number of seconding states required, and permitting the CSO to take decisions and recommend action even in the absence of agreement from the parties involved in the situation. Canada also wanted this last to apply to the CSO's invocation of the strengthened human dimension mechanism.

Canada's elaboration of the proposed crisis management procedure continued to go further than any other yet tabled. In addition, Canada's proposals for support of verification efforts and for dialogue on arms transfers, non-proliferation and UN issues, as well as suggestions for linking the CPC's work to that of other CSCE institutions had not yet received much hearing.

At the same time that Canada circulated its paper, four papers on the same subject were tabled in the Consultative Committee by Austria-Hungary-Poland, Finland-Switzerland, the US and the EC respectively. All of these broadly agreed on three categories into which future CPC tasks could fall: 1) security dialogue; 2) conflict prevention and crisis management; and 3) implementation of CSBMs. Beyond this, opinion ranged widely, with minimalist and maximalist visions again coming head-to-head. The minimalists, which included the EC, the US and Sweden, balked at the CPC assuming crisis management functions -- regarded as the purview of the CSO -- and wanted no reference to such instruments in the Prague Council document. More generally, the minimalists doubted that the CSCE could prevent or resolve conflicts, especially as membership grew beyond 35, and advocated that the CSCE call on other international organizations in dealing with conflicts and crises. Although the organizations remained unspecified, Canada assumed they would have a Euro-centric focus, i.e. the Council of Europe in the area of human rights and the EC in conflict prevention and resolution.

Canada, which continued to regard the further development of the CPC as essential to transforming the CSCE into an operational institution with the capability to prevent and resolve conflicts and manage crises, was feeling some dismay that its views were less widely shared than it had hoped. The maximalists, including Canada, Austria, Poland, Hungary and Finland wanted specific mention of the CPC's role in conflict prevention and crisis management, including a reference to fact-finding missions, monitor missions and good offices. Canada also wanted to see a reference to multinational verification. Although Canada had agreed with the CSCE's remit of the Yugoslav conflict to the EC, it insisted that the CSCE should keep the issue under constant review. It continued to believe that the CSCE -- as the only pan-European and transatlantic security forum -- should play a central role in conflict prevention and crisis management. This would best serve Canadian interests and respond to the concerns of Central and East European states.

Peacekeeping

Proposals for CSCE military forces, which had first been raised before the Paris Summit, began to seem less academic after fighting broke out in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1991. Canada had noted the CSCE potential for peacekeeping as early as May 1990, in Clark's Humber College speech. At the Moscow meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall repeated the call for CSCE peacekeeping, as did German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Preliminary ideas on how CSCE peacekeeping might be implemented began to circulate shortly