

allowed in response to a resumption of nuclear testing by India.<sup>33</sup>

Yet whether endorsement can be secured may be less important than the fact that further movement toward a realization of Indian nuclear ambitions increases the chances that the "non-testing norm" is widely perceived as weak and ineffectual. In the face of an evolving Indian deterrent, even unconditional endorsement might not remove the prospect of Islamabad eventually withdrawing from the regime and resuming its nuclear testing based on considerations of "supreme national interest." And recognition of this fact can only threaten to undermine confidence in the meaning and integrity of the regime, as well as the very purpose and significance CTBT endorsement itself.

## CONCLUSION

Official interest in the doctrine proposed by the NSAB is presently tentative. According to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the document represents "a draft," and has been released as "...a basis of negotiation with the U.S., the Group of 8 and Pakistan." More recently, external Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh noted that while the NSAB proposal represented one of a number of papers requested by the National Security Council, – "(i)t is not a policy document of the Government of India".<sup>34</sup>

Beyond this there has also been a growing recognition in international circles that the document allows room for manoeuvre.<sup>35</sup> And it is clear that many Indians are not insensitive to the cost considerations associated with such a venture.<sup>36</sup>

Yet while India may ultimately reject the minimum deterrent advanced by the Advisory Board, there is presently little indication that it does not remain strongly committed to the development of a minimum deterrent of some variety.

Given the analysis offered above, it is clear that efforts should be made to convince India of the potential costs and dangers which such a course presents.

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<sup>33</sup> See Shaheen Sehbai, "Washington's Concession for CTBT Signing: Pakistan to Resume Tests if India Does", *Dawn* (Internet Edition) (21 September 1999), p. 1.

<sup>34</sup> As quoted in C. Raja Mohan, "India Not to Engage in a N-Arms Race: Jaswant", *The Hindu* (29 November 1999), p. 6. In fact, in his interview with Mohan, Singh refers to the NSAB as a group of non-official strategic experts and analysts tasked by the National Security Council to prepare a number of papers on various topics.

<sup>35</sup> C. Raja Mohan, "Hostility to N-Doctrine Subsiding," *The Hindu* (28 August 1999), p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> In this regard, C. Raja Mohan recently observed that "there is a Finance Ministry (in India) as well. It isn't as though the nuclear robots are running the show." See Sadand Dhume, "Choosing the Target," p. 30.