

Figure 5 Key Elements of Canada's Non-Proliferation Policy

- Nuclear co-operation will be authorized *only* for those non-nuclear weapons states that have made a general commitment to non-proliferation by either having ratified the NPT or having taken an equivalent binding step and that have thereby accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities.
- Nuclear exports can go forward only to those states (both non-nuclear and nuclear weapons states) which have undertaken to accept in a formal agreement a number of additional requirements. These include:
 - an assurance that Canadian-supplied nuclear items will not be used in connection with the production of nuclear explosive devices;
 - a provision for fallback safeguards in the event that a situation arises where the IAEA is unable to continue to perform its safeguards functions;
 - control over the retransfer of Canadian-supplied nuclear items;
 - control over the reprocessing of Canadian-origin spent fuel, subsequent storage of the separated plutonium, and enrichment beyond 20 per cent U-235 of Canadian-origin uranium; and
 - an assurance that adequate physical protection measures will be applied.
- Support for measures aimed at the maintenance and strengthening of the existing nuclear non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. These include: