

My delegation could make many observations on the draft convention at the end of the negotiating process. For the moment I will restrict myself to making only a few such observations, relating to some aspects of its content. In the first place, it might perhaps have been desirable to update the preamble, which dates for the most part from 1985, in order to bring it into line with the scope of the general obligations set out in article I.

Second, we consider that the definitions and criteria in article II are consistent with the prohibitions appearing in article I. Even though the definition of chemical weapons displays a degree of latitude, we proceed from the assumption that good faith on the part of the States parties will prevent possible combinations of circumstances from being readily confused with an alleged intention to flout obligations entered into. At all events, in the interests of safety it would appear preferable to have a degree of flexibility in interpretation rather than a narrow definition which might be overtaken in the future by ceaseless technological development, particularly in the field of non-lethal chemicals.

Third, it is true that if law enforcement is not referred to as "domestic", as in article II, paragraph 9 (d), this might give rise to far-fetched interpretations of what the negotiators intended. Consequently, my delegation considers it appropriate to point out that as far as Peru is concerned law enforcement is within the competence of each geographical State, except for activities that might be carried out by United Nations peace-keeping forces.

Fourth, in Peru's view the good faith of the States possessing chemical weapons will be judged by the way in which they implement their general plans for the destruction of their stockpiles; it would be desirable for the destruction of chemical weapons to be effected more rapidly, except in the cases specified in part IV (A), paragraph 21 of the Annex on Implementation and Verification. We continue to regard it as regrettable that States will be under the obligation to destroy only 45 per cent of their chemical weapons by the end of the seventh year of the destruction process, especially since this appears to prejudge the extension of the destruction period for five more years, as referred to in part IV (A), paragraph 24. This is why Peru attaches particular importance to the principle set forth in article IV, paragraph 16, regarding the obligation of a State possessing chemical weapons also to meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of such chemical weapons, unless the executive council decides otherwise.

Fifth, the provisions of article VI, in the view of experts, restrict the scope of verification of world chemical industry. Of course, it was in no one's mind to cover the whole of this dynamic industrial sector, since verification would have been unmanageable and exorbitantly costly. Yet it was thought to be possible to cover more than 30 per cent of "capable facilities". In the end, the objectives of the convention proved to be more modest, either because thresholds were raised or because it focused solely on "PSF facilities".

Sixth, the agreed composition of the executive council was not the happiest solution for Latin America and the Caribbean. We accepted the agreement as the best way of stimulating greater involvement, particularly by