

J125(A74)

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Proposal Abstract J125(A74)

1. Arms Control Problem:

Nuclear weapons - reentry vehicles
- missile tests

2. Verification Type:

(a) Remote sensors - satellite
- shipboard
- radar

(b) Complaints procedure - consultative commission

3. Source:

Scoville, H. "A Leap Forward in Verification". In SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond, pp. 160-182. Edited by M. Willrich and J.B. Rhineland. New York: The Free Press, 1974.

4. Summary:

The author suggests that a limitation on the number of tests of MIRVed missiles could be verified with a high level of assurance using national technical means, primarily satellite and shipboard photography as well as various radar systems. An agreement to restrict tests to existing test ranges would make this task simpler but would not be essential. Such an agreement would be important in monitoring tests of MIRVed SLBMs.

The author suggests that attempts to conceal MIRV testing under the guise of a space program would be difficult to prove unequivocally, but that sufficient doubt would be raised to call for an inquiry through the Standing Consultative Commission established under SALT I. Similarly, MIRV tests designed to have only one reentry vehicle enter the impact area would draw sufficient suspicion as a result of inconsistencies in mass characteristics to justify an inquiry.