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HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME.

MASSACRE AT SINOPÉ.

We need not pause long upon the infelicitous, if not apocryphal exploits, in Asia, of Selim Pacha, who was reported about the same date to have stormed Saffa, and to have won a battle at Gumri, or Alexandropol, on the 13th. Five days later, Ali Pacha was beaten at Akhalzick by General Andronikoff. A more decisive event now arrests our attention. The terrible 30th of November arrived. Six Russian ships of the line, with several smaller vessels of war, suddenly filled the aperture of the harbour of Sinopé. There were in port thirteen Turkish sail, unprepared for action, and not expecting it. But had they even received warning, their whole fleet was no match for the six Russian first-rates, without counting the powerful frigates and other war-craft by which they were supported. We must here observe that, when the Sultan had declared that he was at war, he, in one sense, merely announced a fact; but, with a feeling not usually shown on such occasions, he added that his was purely and essentially a defensive struggle; that he wished but to deliver his territories from the armed stranger and the invader, and that he would nowhere either violate the Russian frontiers, or seek to retaliate the aggression which he had suffered.

Admiral Nachimoff commanded the Russian fleet at Sinopé, and Osman Pacha the Turkish naval detachment. This last was, in a short time, burnt and destroyed. Seven frigates, one steam frigate, two schooners, and three transports were, all except two reduced to a shapeless heap of floating timbers, blackened with gunpowder, stained with blood, and covered with mutilated human limbs, and the corpses of 5000 brave and unfortunate Turks who, taken at fatal disadvantage, had fought to the last with unshaken heroism. In a few minutes after the action began, the outer vessels of the Turkish detachment were blown "into one long port-hole." The feeble battery of Sinopé, overhead, brought no succour. When its untimely guns were at length fired, some of their shot fell among the friends whom they were destined to protect. Admiral Nachimoff's squadron sustained comparatively little injury, though some of the vessels showed how strenuous had been the unavailing resistance. A few Turks swam to land, and, clambering over the heights, escaped. Osman Pacha, before he could set fire to his own flag-ship, was taken prisoner, desperately wounded. The chief prizes which the Russians thought it still possible to remove, foundered while towed behind them in the Black Sea. Osman Pacha, whom they carried half dead to Sebastopol, expired there within six weeks from his arrival. The news of this event electrified all Europe. When it was known at St. Petersburg, the Czar distributed naval decorations, ordered a solemn "Te Deum" in the churches, and published an exulting manifesto.

WAR IN ASIA IN 1853 AND 1854.

We have alluded to the unsatisfactory vicissitudes of the war in Asia. The Turkish forces destined to operate in Anatolia, Abasia, and Armenia were in a state of demoralization, which a consummate General, armed with unlimited authority, could not have at once repaired. General Guyon, our countryman, who had assumed the Ottoman name and style of Kouschid Bey, is an instructed soldier and an able man; but he was, during all this time and for afterwards, in a subordinate position. He was compelled to witness disasters which he knew how, but which he was not permitted, to avert. The river Araks forms the frontier between the Russian conquests and the Turkish possessions in Asia. In this neighbourhood the doubtful struggle raged to and fro, with much slaughter but small results, from July to December. At the battle of Akhalzick, on the 18th of November, and, indeed, at the previous combat near Kars, one important military observation was made, and has been preserved. The Russians owed these victories in part to the weight of the metal in their field artillery. It is usual to constitute such batteries of 12-pounder guns. The Russian field batteries, however, consisted of 16-pounder guns; and yet they were moved, mounted, and managed with all the requisite ease and rapidity. We could not interrupt the sequence of the serious events which marked a more vigorous and decisive campaign in Europe, to recount the contemporary struggles in Asia. This necessitates both a retrospect and an anticipation; but they shall be brief. In August, Mustapha Zafir Pacha, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Batoum, advanced from Kars, and attacked General Prince Bebutoff without success. That officer, who appears to be a man of no mean ability, assumed the offensive himself on the next day, which was the 6th of August, and defeated him, at Kurukdar, near Gumri. General Bebutoff had worsted Selim, at Bayazid, in July. Bayazid stands between the sources of the Euphrates and those of the Araks, communicating directly with Trebizond. General Bebutoff, therefore, by this last exploit, opened the high road from Persia to Anatolia, by the south of Mount Ararat. At this time, such were the difficulties interposed by Schahryl in the Caucasus, that almost all the provisions and supplies of the Russians at Tiflis, and in advance of it, were

conveyed to them by the precarious communications of the Caspian Sea; and, had a competent officer commanded the Turks in Kars, it is hard to say to what extremities the enemy might have been reduced. But, nothing could exceed Selim Pacha's unfitness for his situation. This Selim (for there are two in the war of Asia) displayed from the first not even the courage of a common soldier. But let us describe the chief combat in this Asiatic war. While Bebutoff lay in front of the main body of the Turks, some of Andronikoff's division, greatly to the Turkish right, had defeated the outposts, and were truly reported to be stealing round by the rear of that flank towards Erzeroum. General Guyon, being asked his opinion, at a Council of War summoned in haste and terror, advised an instantaneous advance, on the 4th of August, of the whole army upon Bebutoff, and then a rapid return against the column behind, near Erzeroum. By this means, the Pacha could use all his force in succession against each of his divided enemies; but, by hesitation, he would soon allow them to press him, as it were, in a vice. Unfortunately, the 4th and 5th of August, were esteemed unlucky days in the Turkish calendar, and the movement was delayed till the 6th. Between the Turks—who had been forced back from their former positions—and Kars, lay the enemy. Behind him rose the white towers of Gumri; and, beyond these, and on each side of them, shone the snow-crowned hills of Georgia. Thirty-five thousand Turks advanced at midnight, by the glimmer of torches, to surprise the Russian position; but treachery had preceded them, and they found that they were expected. It was a disgraceful day. Zafir Pacha lost heart and head at the first shot, and galloped about the field pale with terror himself, and terrifying his followers. Resul Pacha fled at once, on the right flank. Vely Pacha, through jealousy of Guyon, neglected to take that brave and collected soldier's advice, which would have retrieved the day. The superior officers deserted their men. Half an hour after the troops were engaged, none of the Bunbushis or Muralais (the colonels and the majors) were to be seen. The mountain battery which had seized the heights, commanding the Russian right, never fired a gun—never acted at all. Major Teyve, an American, who was there, expostulated in vain. Of the forty infantry battalions, the 5th Anatolian and the 4th Desardet regiments alone resisted cavalry. One man, and one only, may be said to have behaved with real distinction—this was Tahir Pacha, in command of the Turkish Artillery, which was admirably worked from first to last. Such was the fight beyond the hills of Hadji Veleky, where 35,000 Turks were ignobly defeated by 18,000 Russians, whom they had thought to take by surprise. No reliance can be, or ought to be, placed on the conduct in the field of men who are pusillanimously, as well as unskillfully officered and led.

General Bebutoff had blown up the forts of Bayazid, as he wanted to use the garrison in the field: such a measure would have saved Napoleon in 1813, and Charles I. in the Great Rebellion.

We may here mention that, at the first outbreak of hostilities, the Russians had evacuated their forts in another scene of this widely-scattered conflict—we mean along the eastern shore of the Black Sea, among the Tcherkessians of Circassia. These forts protected their most direct communications through the Caucasus with the Georgian provinces.

On the 24th of August, however, General Bebutoff's combinations were discontinued by the hero Schahryl—but for whom, indeed, Russia would, long ago, have securely appropriated all the Turkish provinces on the south of the Black Sea. This intrepid man, with 20,000 Lezhian Circassians, broke into Georgia, and carried away hostages from Tiflis itself. This sort of excursion seems to be with him a regular annual operation. When most forgotten, he is sure to be near. We return to Europe.

WINTER CAMPAIGN ON THE DANUBE.

On the 20th of December, the Turks who had recently struck a sharp blow at Matchin in the Northern Dobrukscha, at the extreme right of their line, were equally active and successful on its extreme left. They advanced from Kalarasch and stormed, though they meant not to keep it, the post of Karakal on the Aluta. We have explained the motives of this merely ostensible and misleading ubiquity on the part of Omer Pacha. The Turks retired from Karakal, and even from Kalarasch, but fortified themselves with unwearied assiduity in Widdin, in Rahova, and in Nicopolis, on their own side of the Danube. With respect to Matchin, Omer Pacha had still less desire to retain it. He never intended to occupy the Dobrukscha during the sickly months which were impending. On the contrary, he wished the Russians to lose themselves in that fatal position, and they did. Where he could strike, he struck; and, if the irritation of defeat, combined with the real facility of the occupation, should induce the enemy to advance, it was what he wished. He fixed his own headquarters at Rutschuk, and awaited events.

The severity of the weather, from the 22d of December, rendered operations for some days impossible. It was the armistice of nature. About this time, Constantinople was racked with ministerial changes and political struggles. The Ottoman Pacha was superseded by Halil Pacha, and some popular outbreak had seemed not improbable. The French Ambassador offered the Sultan the

protection of the French fleet, but Abdul Medjid replied magnanimously that "he would rather abdicate than accept foreign assistance against his own people." On Christmas-day, the Allied squadrons were still in Beicos Bay; and, though more decisive counsels were known to have animated (since the catastrophe of Sinopé), the counsels of the Maritime Powers, the state of the Black Sea delayed till the 4th January the entrance of the fleets. The Union Jack and the Eagle were still reflected in the waters of the Bosphorus from the masts of a mighty but inactive armada.

The Russians had sustained many checks in the field. The spell of their arms was departing. But they announced how inadequate their preparations had been, how every day their position was strengthened, and in what irresistible force they would soon establish themselves throughout the scene of action. Two hundred thousand soldiers were to be poured into the Principalities, and were in fact fast arriving at their destination, in spite of the horrors of long winter marches through a thousand obstacles.

Oster Sacken's corps was marked and proclaimed with formidable regularity in all the stages of its approach. A sublime diary diversified the journals of Europe, describing the nearer and nearer progress of those invincible legions through ice and snow and storm; and amidst difficulties hardly to be conceived. For weeks the attention of the world tracked in suspense the "awful advance." The troops, meantime, which were already in Wallachia, spread themselves (with very poor strategy, in our humble opinion, not to speak of the impolicy of the demonstration) along the Austrian frontier, from Orsova nearly to Kronstadt, in Transylvania. Any one who but glances at a map will see the uselessness, the waste of men, the insanity of this disposition. Not such the conduct of Omer Pacha. Ever warily withdrawing, in reality, his right wing, he abandoned the northern Dobrukscha, and fixed upon Trajan's Wall as the limits of his first stand in that direction. This memorable barrier against the cognate barbarians of ancient times, extends eastwards, from a little below Czernavoda, on the Danube, to Kustendjeh, on the coast. Just about that point, the Danube, which has been flowing from east to west, takes a bend at right angles to the north, and encloses the Dobrukschia between its waters and the sea. At Galatz, some eighty miles further, it resumes, at another right angle, its former eastward course, and thus furnishes the western and northern boundaries of that vast morass called the Dobrukscha, of which the Euxine and Trajan's Wall, respectively, form the eastern and southern limitation. Behind Trajan's Wall Omer Pacha stationed a force sufficient to impose quarantine upon the advancing and pestilence-bearing invaders. It was a front of twenty miles to defend, or less; for it was not passable or practicable for more than two-thirds of its extent; and this was under thirty miles. It was General Luders who was to conduct the invaders on this side.

The Russians, having raised intrenchments at Bucharest, began a serious triple advance. One corps, 22,000 strong, was to attack Kalafat; a second was to occupy Karakal; and the third was to move down the Aluta towards Turna. With these operations (and the withdrawal of the Russian fleet into Sebastopol) ended the year 1853. And in the opening days of the next year (though on the "Old Christmas-day" of '53, according to the Russian style, which still reckons by the Julian Calendar), one of the most brilliant feats of arms in modern Turkish history astonished the world, and proved what vigour still was left in the sick man.

BATTLE OF CITATE.

Of the three Russian corps, whose orders to execute a simultaneous advance we have mentioned, the westernmost was that which was ready to enter first into action. "The Pagans," stationed at Kalafat, were those whom it was the special business of this column "to annihilate." It was commanded by General Fishback, under whom acted Generals Engelhardt and Bellegarde; while Prince Vassilitchkoff led the cavalry. Their whole corps consisted of but 22,000 men, of whom 7000 moved more slowly to act as a reserve, loitering near Karaul, on the left of the line of march. The operations, in our humble opinion, continue still to evince the incapacity of the Russian Generals. There was a neighbouring column, only a few miles to the left, as strong as their own. Had both been rapidly united, and flung together either upon Kalarasch, and so across to Rahova, or hurled in combination against Kalafat, resistance would have been clearly impossible. But they moved in parallel lines, each with a different, each its own distinct, destination. But, doubtless, the operation which we have hinted, and which would have been very easy to French troops, and even to our own, required great celerity of movement. Otherwise, the dispersed Osmanlis would themselves have had time to make a corresponding concentration. Now in celerity of movement, the Russians are not only inferior to the French (whose force in this excel all other modern nations, and indeed excel all the regular armies that ever existed), but inferior to them. For commissariat reasons (and several others), it is extremely inconvenient and undivisible to concentrate a very large body of men except just before fighting; and the time allowed by this last expression ought not to be longer for an army of fifty, or even seventy thousand men (previously distributed at proper strategic points, or, in other words,

well led), than twenty-four hours. All great generals have recognised this principle, and have tried so to arrange, that they could, in the presence of the enemy, reduce it to practice. But while the French habitually do in twenty-four hours, the Russians, during this war, have frequently taken six and even fourteen days to accomplish. Let us attend General Fishback in his present proceedings. Not being joined by the column, on his left, nor by any of the idle garrisons to the rear of his right, and having disposed of seven thousand of his own men as a reserve, he found, when he arrived at Citate, that he had with him only fifteen thousand. Now, the Turks at Kalafat, whom he was going to attack, were intrenched; and no soldiers defend intrenchments better. Moreover, their force was numerically equal to his own; and, finally, they were in immediate communication with Widdin, across the Danube, and probably from Widdin would be largely supported. He began to doubt whether he was strong enough, for his undertaking; the only wonder is, that he had not entertained this doubt a week earlier. Accordingly, this intending assailant suddenly halted at Citate, and began to throw up intrenchments, not between the village and the Turks, but behind the village. In this deliberate manner he was occupied during the 4th and 5th of January, "new style," and the assault upon Kalafat was postponed to the 13th, the Russian New-year's Day. Fishback would open the Julian year brilliantly; large reinforcements were demanded; the inactive columns on his right were summoned to join him from Radova, Orsova, and the Transylvanian frontier; and then a grand combined onslaught would drive the Turks into the Danube, or at the worst compel them to cross it, and seek refuge in Widdin. These proceedings clearly prove the justice of our criticism on the original plan, which they stultify. A strategy which is always correcting itself, must be bad; nor is even, in general, the correction good; for a wise measure, in war, is a wise measure only at the precise moment for it. Next day it is often as foolish as the blunder which it is meant to repair. The Russian Generals are always busy each week with the measures, which belong to the preceding week, for it is only a week afterwards, that they discover what ought to have been done a week before; and then with equal folly, they do it, though it has become in its turn as unsuitable as their former measures. They are aware of an opening when they see the enemy cover it; and though it is no longer an opening (for the ward of the fence is up), they thrust. On the other hand, they are themselves exposed; they know it not, but they suddenly feel the point, and then they hurry in that guard to avert a lounge which is not coming—it has come already, and pierced home. Can these men be called Generals?

The Pachas, Achmet and Ismail, who commanded at Kalafat, were informed of all General Fishback's movements, and well knew that the intended attack of the 13th of January would be very serious. Resolute leaders of resolute troops, they yet looked forward with anxiety to an encounter with forty-five thousand Russians, exactly three times the number of their own force. They determined not to await the leisure of the Russians, or the ultimate danger of such an assault, but to sally forth at once, and to fight General Fishback at Citate, on more equal terms. At daybreak therefore, on the 6th of January (Christmas-day in Russia), they marched from Kalafat. They had 5000 field-guns, ten thousand regular infantry, whom Ismail and Achmet Pacha themselves led in person; four thousand cavalry, commanded by Mustapha Bey; and a thousand Bushibozouks, under the colonelcy of the gallant and adventurous Skender-Beg, of historic name. The road to Citate led through Romania, Galatz, Funtina, and Moglovitza. To prevent any surprise of Kalafat in their absence, Ismail had ordered over 3000 of the garrison of Widdin, as a temporary guard. He took the further precaution of leaving about an equal number of troops at Moglovitza, on the road, in order to maintain his communications, and at need, protect his retreat, if he was beaten. By their help he would, at the worst, rally his force at Moglovitza. It was nine o'clock, as the assailants entered Citate, in the streets of which were posted 3000 Russians and four guns. By a cross street, the Turks brought some of their own pieces to play upon the defenders, and then Achmet charged them in front with his infantry. After the first onset, the Turks disclaimed the restraints of rank and file—restraints not suited to street-fighting. The battle resembled a meeting of innumerable pairs of duellists; and for this species of close and personal action, the Turks had the advantage in arms, in bodily vigour, and in courage. The Russian soldier possessed now no weapon but his bayonet, and was clumsily accoutred. The agile Turk had the bayonet also, and, if, in the trial, or the turns of the dense and wild struggle, a blade and its shorter thrust, or its cut, were more desirable, he instantly had the ready and national weapon in his hands. From house to house—storming every place out of the window of which a shot had been fired—from crossing to crossing—in doors and out of doors—the assailants pressed back the Russians; and, in three hours, had driven them into their intrenchments. Against these the Turks forthwith brought up their field-pieces, which, we believe, were as many as fifteen; and here they suffered their principal loss that day. The "cannonade" was briskly sustained on both sides, and several bold assaults upon the works

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