with an English translation by David Magie, Ph.D., Vol. II, pp. 113-131; Gibbon's History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 2nd ed. by Milman, Vol. I, p. 158. Lampridius also says that the Emperor established a "*senaculum*" or women's Senate on the Quirinal Hill, which, under the presidency of his mother, enacted absurd decrees concerning matters of court etiquette. (op. cit. p. 113-115). The name "senaculum" (which properly denotes a place in which the Senators waited while the Senate was not in session) seems to have been applied to this gathering of matrons merely for the purpose of giving it a quasi-political importance (op. cit. p. 112, note 6). Elagabalus and his mother were slain by a mob in A.D. 222. "And the first measure enacted after the death of Antonius Elagabalus," says Lampridius (op. cit. p. 143), "provided that no woman should ever enter the Senate, and that whoever should cause a woman to enter, his life should be declared doomed and forfeited to the kingdom of the dead."

11. *The Decisions.*—Having thus dealt with the political position of women under the common law, it will now be convenient to refer to the pertinent decisions.

The leading case is that of *Chorlton* v. *Lings*, ib. supra, decided in 1868. It concerned the interpretation of the Representation of the People Act, 1867 (30-31 Vict. Cap. 102). The Reform Act of 1832 (2 Wm. 4, c. 45) in referring to the old rights of franchise, used the general word "person" with reference to the voter (s. 18), but the new franchise was conferred only on "every male person of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity," etc. (secs. 19 and 20). The Representation of the People Act, 1867, enacted that, "Every man shall be entitled to be registered as a voter . . . . who is qualified as follows . . . . is of full age and not subject to any legal incapacity," etc. (s. 3). By Lord Brougham's Act, (13–14 Vict. c. 21, s. 4) "Words importing the masculine gender shall be deemed and taken to include females unless the contrary as to gender is expressly provided." Upon this, it was contended that the word "man" in the Act of 1867 included "women," and that they were, therefore, entitled to be registered as voters. The Court (Bovill, C.J., and Willes, Byles and Keating, JJ.) held that it did not. Their decision rests on two principal grounds: (1) that at common law women were under a legal incapacity to vote for members of Parliament, and (2) that the subject matter and general scope and language of the Act of 1867, when read with the Reform Act of 1832, show that the legislature was dealing only with the qualification to vote of men in the sense of male persons, and that, notwithstanding Lord Brougham's Act, it could not be presumed to have intended, by the mere use of the word "man," to extend the franchise to women, who theretofore did not enjoy it.

"There is," said Bovill, C.J., (p. 386), "no doubt that in many statutes, 'men' may be properly held to include women, whilst in others it would be ridiculous to suppose that the word was used in any other sense than as designating the male sex: and we must