

a review of the arrangements of the Alliance with the object of enabling them to participate in a more meaningful way in the nuclear decisions of the Alliance. There has also been a lingering and intermittent doubt in some European minds as to whether, in the face of potential retaliation against its own cities, the United States would, in fact, be prepared to use its nuclear deterrent unequivocally in the defence of Europe in the event of a nuclear attack.

I have spoken of the European point of view generally because I believe it is true to say that many of the major European countries feel that, in one way or another, the arrangements of the Alliance should reflect greater recognition of European aspirations and of European security requirements. That view has, of course, been held most strongly by France, which believes that these requirements can be met only in the context of a purely European defence policy and which has proceeded in that belief to build up its own national nuclear force.

For its part, the United States is prepared to recognize what Mr. W.W. Rostow, the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council of the State Department, described in a speech last June as the "natural desire of major European countries to play a larger role in strategic deterrence". It is the American view that the best way of meeting that desire is by closer integration and not by a fragmentation of nuclear capabilities, which, they feel, is a course that would be bound to have undesirable implications for the political posture of the Alliance. The concept of closer military integration, I might say parenthetically, is one to which the Canadian Government fully subscribes.

It is against this background that the proposal has been put forward for the establishment of a multilateral force. Such a force would comprise up to 25 surface ships, manned by mixed crews, and carrying a total of 200 "Polaris" missiles. The force would be owned and financed jointly by the contributing countries and controlled by them. In putting forward this proposal, the United States have argued that it would do three things:

First, it would add to the total strategic strength of the Atlantic Alliance.

Second, it would give the Europeans a real share in strategic planning and a voice in the control of the strategic deterrent in time of crisis. By doing this, it would also diminish the risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Third, it would give tangible substance to the United States commitment to Europe, and thus to the concept of transatlantic integration.

It is only fair to say that, while this multilateral-force project has commended itself to a number of European countries (notably Germany), it has recently engendered considerable opposition in France. The French have argued that such a project would not give Europeans any real control over the bulk of the strategic forces of the Alliance, which are American; that it is