

We recognize that the establishment of a system of safeguards which included Canadian territory would mean that there might be international teams of observers, equipped with electronic devices and the necessary communications, stationed in Canada with certain rights of inspection and freedom of movement. We further recognize that foreign aircraft for international inspection purposes might be authorized to overfly Canada and that logistic support elements for such aircraft would probably be stationed in Canada. We also recognize that Canada might well be called upon to provide personnel, aircraft and other kinds of support as a contribution to the system. These various obligations are considered acceptable in principle, subject to the negotiation of the details on a equitable basis. In other words, just as Canada has previously endorsed the more general concept of an Arctic Zone of international inspection as part of a wider system, we are prepared to accept such a zone in itself.

We would like to think that the proposal now before us is only a first step, to be followed both by disarmament measures relating to nuclear and conventional weapons and forces and by a further extension of safeguards against surprise attack. It is our hope that co-operation in the development of security in the Arctic can provide a basis for larger agreements relating to disarmament and other questions, which could be examined jointly with the U.S.S.R. Among these other measures which might be discussed, for example, are those which would be necessary to verify compliance with an agreement to suspend nuclear tests.

I must say that the reception given to the United States proposal by the Soviet Representative this morning was depressing indeed. It was more than depressing--in our view the position taken by the Soviet Representative was in some ways incomprehensible. If the Soviet Government is seriously worried about developments in the Arctic, why do they reject a proposal designed to set up inspection in the area? They may estimate that such inspection can serve no useful purpose and cannot diminish insecurity, but how can they know this in advance?

The United States draft resolution calls on the states mentioned "to designate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agreeing on the technical arrangements required." Surely it is in such discussions that the scope of inspection required and its objectives could be examined. Does the Soviet Government refuse even to discuss these problems and, if I may ask, what harm could it do to the interests of the Soviet Government to participate in such discussions? They would at least have demonstrated their willingness to examine all possibilities of decreasing international tension. We for our part believe that the plan for a northern zone of inspection is practicable and important and