

Nations to make prior arrangements for the organization of international forces which could be used in such a situation. Smaller countries like my own do not ordinarily have armed forces available for quick despatch to any part of the world; and we had not been given any indication that the Security Council would be able to agree on measures by which such forces would be required. Our experience had led us to believe that action of this kind would not be possible because of the operation of the veto.

The Korean war has underlined the necessity for arrangements within the United Nations, which would enable a genuinely international force to be quickly assembled. The resolution which was recently passed by the General Assembly attempts to provide such permanent arrangements; and it seems to me to be well designed to that end. We in Canada have taken special interest in this proposal for the creation on a permanent basis of international forces earmarked to carry out obligations we have all undertaken under the United Nations Charter. When we announced in Canada the raising of our special force for service in Korea, we made it clear that this force would be available for whatever action might be necessary in any quarter of the globe in order to carry out our military obligations either under the United Nations Charter or under the North Atlantic Treaty. We were the first country, I believe, to earmark a portion of our forces in this way. And I think I am right in saying that that declaration by the Canadian Government was the germ from which the central section of the present Assembly resolution was developed; that section in which it is recommended that each member of the United Nations should, and I quote, "maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained and organized that they could promptly be made available for service as a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the General Assembly or the Security Council". If member states carry out this recommendation, the United Nations will never again be in the position in which it found itself last June.

I have been speaking so far of proposals which would result in an international force composed of separate national contingents. It may be that in present circumstances we can hardly expect to go much further than this. On the other hand, I can see advantages in the creation of one or two genuinely United Nations police divisions in which volunteers would enlist as individuals, and in which the training would be conducted by the United Nations itself from the outset. The problems of organizing, supplying and commanding such a polyglot force and of maintaining discipline in it would be formidable. But they need not prove insuperable. Certainly the advantages of such a force, even if it were a small one, would be great. The United Nations would then be equipped with a military force which was in the fullest sense its own and which could be used to assist in national defence against small aggressions and help prevent them developing into big ones. Divisions of this international character would also have the advantage of giving an opportunity of serving the United Nations to nationals from countries too small to contribute national contingents of their own. The formation of such divisions clearly demands further study. This also has been provided