

and cultural dimensions of the arms control process. Central to arms control negotiations is the nature of arms control language. Negotiators need, somehow, to penetrate the thought processes of their opponents, in order to amend the ways in which the latter think. Confidence building measures contribute to the transformation of world views. But while history suggests that we must move steadily toward the disarmament goal, there was concern expressed about the nature of western negotiating cultures. Were we, Dr. Jim Boutilier wondered, the victims in many cases of our own dedication to conciliation and reasonableness? Did that dedication afford duplicitous dictators with the opportunity for delay; delay which could be fatal in the long term.

Another critical issue embodied in many of the papers related to the matter of sovereignty. The growth in international regulatory regimes, like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and a greater propensity for intervention in the domestic affairs of states suggested a steady diminution of state sovereignty. There were, however, very real limits to interventionist power. The inability of the IAEA to conduct on-site inspections in North Korea was a case in point. Even in Iraq, as Ron Cleminson confirmed, highly intrusive inspection procedures could not guarantee complete transparency. Despite a menu of sticks and carrots, the United States has enjoyed relatively little success in altering North Korea's nuclear weapons policies. As James MacIntosh indicated, timing was a critical ingredient in the application of power: too soon and it was inappropriate; too late and it was irrelevant. One of the lessons to emerge from the workshop discussions was the need to intervene in a timely fashion, to prevent the accumulation of violations of which Dr. Bedeski spoke.

But without political will there could be no intervention and many of the papers addressed this concern. Central to political will, particularly in the case of multilateral initiatives, was the achievement of consensus. It was clear around the workshop table alone, that there was a lack of consensus. Dr. Boutilier maintained that the nuclear negotiating war with North Korea was,