

could be obtained, there was little doubt that the percentage of national income being spent for military purposes in the U.S.S.R. was considerably greater than comparable expenditure in the Western democracies, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

In the same vein, the representatives of the non-Communist states reviewed at length the record of the Soviet Union in frustrating for the past three years any effective attempts to secure international action in the fields of atomic energy control and disarmament. While paying lip-service to the principle of international control in these fields, the Soviet Union had firmly maintained that it would not surrender one iota of its national sovereignty in permitting inspection of its atomic plants or of its military establishments. Unless the Soviet Union was prepared to accept such inspection and verification, its statements in support of international control were "hypocritical and meaningless".* Many representatives also pointed out that the rest of the world was prepared to accept safeguards of this nature, and was prepared to exercise national sovereignty jointly for this purpose. The Soviet Union's refusal to accept such safeguards thus amounted in fact to a demand for unilateral disarmament of the West.

On the subject of the North Atlantic Pact, numerous speakers pointed out that it was a defence pact designed to preserve the peace by making it clear to any potential aggressor that the nations of the Atlantic community would take common action against him if he was so unwise as to embark on war. The North Atlantic Pact was not directed against any state with peaceful intentions. It threatened no one and merely gave a necessary warning to potential aggressors. The nations of the Western world had already twice in the last thirty-five years been compelled to fight desperate wars against tyrants who had sought world domination. Twice they had been unprepared in the face of such aggression, and they were now determined not to be unprepared if any third aggressor should have similar designs. Until the United Nations could provide a security system which would guarantee the continuance of peace, the Western states considered themselves compelled to take steps, such as the North Atlantic Pact, for their self-protection. More than one speaker emphasized this argument by pointing to the network of alliances for defence and friendship which so closely knit the states of Eastern Europe.

What most Western speakers found paradoxical, however, was the fact that the condemnation, set forth in the first part of the Soviet proposal, and which in the view of many was framed in insulting and defamatory terms, should be coupled with a recommendation to conclude a pact of peace. It did not seem likely that such proposals would commend themselves to countries which supporters of the Soviet resolution referred to as "instigators and strategists of the cold war". The obvious conclusion was that the proposal had been put forward purely for propaganda purposes. Speaker after speaker underlined this aspect of the item under discussion and called upon the Soviet Union to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, not by meaningless declarations but by unequivocal action.

Several speakers charged the Communists with nourishing the doctrine of the inevitability of war and with endeavouring to bring about world revolution by violent means. In the opinion of these representatives, the Soviet spokesmen's claims to seek peace were more than cancelled out by the unbridled campaigns of hate against the Western world carried on by

*From statement by Canadian Representative in Political Committee, November 15, 1949. For text, see Appendix 5, pp. 226-235.