

statesmen and administrators is not the question of its increase, but of its development. Halfpenny newspapers may talk cheerfully of adding by a stroke of the pen German South-West and East Africa to the Empire; but responsible officials who know the difficulties in the way may be less ready to welcome a new burden of responsibilities. Be this as it may, nothing can alter the fact that Great Britain entered upon this war with clean hands, and that she will not soil them during its continuance.

It is, one recognizes, a dangerous thing to constitute oneself judge in one's own cause. As a rule truth lies in the mean, between the extremes of rival litigants. Thus, though we know the resistance to Napoleon's aims to world-empire to have been righteous and necessary, we still recognize that Napoleon, in his assertion of the doctrine, *la carrière ouverte aux talents*, and in his promulgation of the Code that goes by his name, represented much against which the crowned heads of Europe were vainly contending. Often the deeper is our knowledge, the stronger becomes the case that can be made for the side which has failed and is therefore discredited. But there are limits to these grounds for cool-headed doubt and scepticism; and, when the case of our adversary can be decided by his own admissions, it would be the merest pedantry to affect an attitude of uncertainty. The question of Servia does not greatly interest the ordinary Englishman; though no one can read the British White Book without arriving at the conviction that Austria did not intend that Servia should comply with her conditions, and that the German Ambassador, at any rate, encouraged Austria in this attitude. But, when Germany proceeded to violate the neutrality of Belgium on the avowed ground that the measure was a political necessity, and that the