

great care and with sensitivity to every political nuance. For example, because of Arab objections and undoubted Soviet concurrence, his observation of March 19 to the Security Council that UNIFIL should prevent "unauthorized armed persons" from entering the zone of UNIFIL competence was altered to read "to ensure peaceful character of the area of operations, and to that end control movement into and out of the zone". The issue of what forces should be allowed or denied to enter proved a continuing source of difficulty for UNIFIL.

Deployment

The interests of speed and efficiency, the Secretary-General drew, as in previous cases, on the resources of existing peacekeeping operations. Advance organizational and logistic personnel (Canadian, Swedish and Iranian) drawn from UNTSO (the UN Truce Supervisory Organization), UNEF and UNDOF, arrived within days under the interim command of Major-General E. A. Erskine, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO. In addition, offers of troops were accepted from France, Nepal, and Norway; these advance units arrived March 23. The unsolicited French offer particularly significant. The five permanent members had been specifically excluded from UNEF and UNDOF, although the Soviet Union had, at that time, proposed such participation. This time France, which helped to found the state of Lebanon, reported that it considered it a "moral duty" to contribute "in order to preserve the territorial integrity of Lebanon". As in all cases of composition, approval by the members of the Security Council was requested and granted. The U.S.S.R. may have opposed French participation, but there is no evidence that it raised any objection. In any event, this arrangement added considerable weight and purpose to the UN presence in the area. France, and later Norway, agreed to supply the crucial element of any UN peacekeeping force - that is, logistics. Canada also agreed, after initial reluctance, to supply a communications unit of about 117 men for a period not exceeding six months. Its logistic capabilities were already stretched to the limit because of continuing participation in UNFICYP (the UN Force in Cyprus), UNEF and UNDOF. The Canadian contingent was, in fact, withdrawn after six months, the first time Canada had adhered to a declared intention of putting a time-limit on its participation in a UN peacekeeping venture.

From the very first days of the oper-

ation, the complexity, sensitivity and danger of the situation became apparent. Israel issued a cease-fire order on March 19, two days after Resolution 425, but received an uncertain reply from the PLO. (As reported in the *New York Times* of March 22, "if they stop bombarding us, we will not respond by shelling them, but behind their lines everything is fair game".) But the PLO was not the only source of trouble. The first units to arrive from Canada, France, Iran and Sweden were sent immediately to the Tyre area, along the Litani River, and also to the temporary UN headquarters at Nagoura, close to the Israeli border. Those that were dispatched from UNDOF, and had to cross the border from Israel, were met with threats from right-wing Christian militia under the command of Major Saad Haddad. However, they were later allowed to pass.

Then, on March 24, the French contingent ran into trouble as it entered Tyre. The PLO, which occupied the base, did not prevent the entry, but they refused to leave themselves. There were numerous skirmishes and, on March 29, UNIFIL suffered its first casualty when a Swedish vehicle hit a land-mine. Nevertheless, as the strength of UNIFIL approached 3,000 by mid-April with the arrival of units from Nepal and Norway, and reached its projected complement of 4,000 with the arrival of Senegalese and Nigerian troops at the end of April, Lieutenant-General Ensio Siilasvuo, Co-ordinator of United Nations Peacekeeping in the Middle East, began to implement his plan to push the deployment of UN troops south of the Litani River with each successive withdrawal of Israeli forces.

But the troubles continued. In the first days of May, French and Senegalese units came under fire at the western end of the line near Tyre, suffering several dead and wounded, as they tried to prevent infiltration of armed Palestinians and left-wing Moslems. At the eastern end of the line round Marjayoun, the Norwegian unit took the view that it had no right to stop the movement in and out of its area of local armed Christian militia on the grounds that they were Lebanese. At the centre of the line, Iranian and Nepalese units tried to avoid taking a stand one way or another. It was reported that officers of various contingents complained that orders coming from the UN Secretariat were "contradictory, unclear and unrealistic". Such problems of general interpretation of the mandate and specific implementation are common to most peacekeeping operations, especially those

Infiltration of armed Palestinians and Moslems