

vulnerability of the ICBM might be to emphasize it as part of the deterrent to make certain that SLBMs remain vulnerable. Agreement on limiting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) either by restricting weapons or by defining certain areas as sanctuaries for SLBMs would be particularly useful in facilitating a credible deterrence.

Above all, the success of strategic disarmament will be dependent on the making of careful decisions regarding the development of new weapon systems. The history of the SALT negotiations demonstrates the futility of using such weapons as bargaining chips; for, once produced, such weapons have not been easily eliminated, as is suggested by MIRV. Efforts

by the U.S. Congress to inquire into the arms-control implications of proposed defence spending is a most positive move for those interested in strategic disarmament.

As we contemplate the future of SALT, I find it particularly remarkable how little risk the United States is willing to take regarding the reduction of strategic weapons compared to the risks that it is taking with nuclear deterrence. If nuclear deterrence is a workable system, it can certainly function at lower levels of destructive capacity. SALT will never be worth its salt until it demonstrates an ability to move in the direction of the reduction of armaments rather than merely provide a cosmetic for a dangerously armed world.

*Deterrence  
can function  
at lower levels  
of capacity*

## Disarmament

# Challenge of arms control to plan for generations

*power, peace and the public*

Thomas Land

the emergence of a new generation of manned, precision-guided weapon systems has overtaken the military bargaining at the deadlocked European conference the reduction of forces facing each other across the Iron Curtain. The Mutual Balanced Force Reduction conference, concerned with bartering tanks against planes stationed in the region, has been on for two years in the ancient and beautiful Central European capital of Vienna. The development of remote-controlled aircraft and high-energy laser weapons means that a surprise assault by numerically-superior Warsaw Pact forces could well be repelled by a small number of technicians. This would enable NATO high command to take the tactical decisions required to fulfil its treaty commitment to deploy the nuclear heads already in the area, and thereby completely to devastate the continent.

No Western government seriously considers that the Soviet Union and its

European allies are likely to attack in the foreseeable future. Nor is the Kremlin endangered by a politically divided as well as morally weakened Western Europe. The vast forces of land armour and fighter bombers, backed by nuclear weapons, on either side match not an actual military threat from the other but a technical capability that is likely to intensify at an accelerating rate with technological advance. The apparent need of states to maintain a high degree of military capability is therefore a reflection of their internal rather than external insecurity in the modern world.

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*Mr. Land is London correspondent for the Financial Post of Canada. As a political journalist he is also associated with The Times, The Observer and The Financial Times of London. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Land.*