

(b) USA would however put out a full “bill of particulars” on the massive Communist violation of the Geneva Accords (William Jorden, formerly of the *New York Times* now on the State Department Policy Planning Staff, now had such a paper in preparation).

(c) USA felt strongly that their action should not repeat not be isolated and would encourage friendly countries to give economic and even military training and equipment (always short of combat forces) to South Vietnam.

(d) It was hoped that the Indians would see USA actions as justifiable in the critical circumstances and would not repeat not make difficulties in the International Commission. The Indians would very shortly be informed of USA plans.

(e) As to timing, McConaughy thought that a word from President Diem might be received within two or three days as to the acceptability of USA proposals. Thereafter, although USA supplies and equipment might be put in the pipe line immediately, it might be up to three weeks before the full range of USA assistance became effective and publicly known.

5. McConaughy then invited any comments or questions I might have. He said that, while USA wanted to give us the fullest possible information, I would understand that Canada was not repeat not being asked as a member of the International Commission to take official cognizance of this information.

6. I expressed appreciation to McConaughy for the very full information and explanations which he had provided. What he had told me had come as no repeat no surprise since we had been given all along extensive briefing by the State Department as USA thinking had developed. He recognized that our membership in the International Commission for Vietnam involved a special relationship to these problems. To some extent the Canadian position was necessarily ambivalent in the sense that while we could appreciate the serious situation which gave rise to the proposed action by USA we must have regard to our relationships and obligation in the Commission. This latter of course hinged on the extent to which the Commission was still regarded as having a valuable role. McConaughy hastened to assure me that it continued to be USA view that the International Commission did have such a role in present circumstances.

7. In response to my reference to the important position of India in relation to these developments, McConaughy expanded on USA assessment of the likely Indian reaction. While he could not repeat not say that USA had received any assurances as to what the Indians might do, he did think that, as a result of the recent talks with Nehru and Desai, the Indians understood better the reasoning behind USA intentions and policy re South Vietnam. Nehru during the visit had continued to take the line that Diem’s lack of broad popular support was the basic reason for the success of the Vietcong and would obviously prefer USA to put further pressure on Diem to effect reforms. But USA was not repeat not going to be doctrinaire and visionary in relation to such a problem at a time when the security and very existence of South Vietnam was in jeopardy. They hoped that the Indians would take a moderately benign attitude towards USA actions, contenting themselves with a relatively passive role and in any event avoiding action in the Commission which would actively embarrass USA. They could not repeat not however be sure that this would be the case although Partha Sarathy’s appointment as the new Indian Chairman was a hopeful sign. The information concerning USA intentions provided to Nehru and Desai during the visit had been only in general terms and the Indians might perhaps suffer some sense of shock when the precise magnitude of aid was disclosed to them.

8. Although without any special instructions, I urged McConaughy to consult the Indians at the earliest possible moment pointing out again that we regarded the Indian position in this whole situation and area and particularly the International Commission as extremely important. McConaughy appeared to take this point.