

carries all kinds of ramifications far beyond the scope of this brief report. But I would like to point out the amazing position of power that General de Gaulle seems to have achieved for France. What will happen if he slams the door in Britain's face again? If Mr. Wilson is sufficiently unwise as to approach General de Gaulle directly, surely it gives the French the chance to set the terms for Britain's entry. From my observation of the silence from France since Mr. Wilson's statement, it seems that there has been no change of heart since the previous rejection. It seems that the General still concludes that the presence of Britain and Germany together inside any economic community would drown the hitherto preponderant voice of France and would put him in permanent danger of isolation.

On the other hand, every other issue in Britain is now subordinate to the question of whether Mr. Wilson's new effort will succeed. He has every incentive to find out exactly what Britain must, and must not, do to qualify for EEC membership.

And what of Canada's position in the event that Britain does join the European Common Market? In this regard, I agree with the editorial in the *Financial Post* of November 19, 1966, which reads as follows:

NO BLEATS THIS TIME PLEASE

A few years ago, when Britain made its first bid to join the European Economic community, Canadians had some reason to deplore the threat this posed to Commonwealth ties. But even though Britain's entry into ECC would temporarily cut into the major gains Canadians were making in selling more to Britain's newly reopened economy, most knowledgeable Canadians involved in world trade believed, all other things notwithstanding, Canada's best long-term interest would be improved if Britain joined Europe. A stronger Britain in a prosperous EEC, it was reasoned, in the long run would create bigger markets for Canada.

Since then, Canadian economic policy has followed a consistent line of self-interest. In so doing, it has freed Britain from any obligation it may have felt toward preserving traditional British markets for Canadian goods.

Among Canada's moves that have clashed with the interests of Britain are the United States-Canada auto production

deal, United States-Canada defence production sharing, slowness in reinterpreting our anti-dumping laws, quickness to buy United States airliners and French executive transports and the recent decision to buy United States, not Britain, naval power plants. The list is long and the North-South, not East-West, trend in our buying and selling is clear.

Because business and government have been pursuing policies profitable to Canada and have by-passed Britain at a time it needed help, there will be no room for complaint if Britain negotiates EEC entry on terms that may tramp on some Canadian toes. Ottawa must now prepare a basic list of trade items of particular concern to Canada and work toward tariff compensation from EEC for losses in Britain. Beyond that, all we can do is assist the British in their bid.

The truth is this: a healthy Britain, playing a full role in Europe has much to offer the world and all traders. It profits no one if Britain's EEC bid fails a second time.

I must say that I agree whole-heartedly with this position.

Turning now to my third heading, the Canadian Delegation, I would also like to make a few remarks concerning the performance of the Canadian delegation at Paris. Everyone was most diligent in both attendance and in performance and I believe that Mr. Perry Ryan, the leader of the delegation, is to be sincerely congratulated on this performance. However, there is a great deal of room for improvement as to the method of preparation and briefing. This is true not because of a lack of effort on the part of the Department of External Affairs but because of a lack of appreciation of what a delegate really needs, particularly when he is seated at the conference table and is required to perform and to take a position on matters of some importance.

I was a last-minute replacement for Senator David Croll and therefore was unable to attend any of the briefing sessions in Canada prior to departure, but I did take one full day with the Department of External Affairs in an effort to educate myself as to the matters on the agenda. The Department were most helpful and I am grateful to them for their assistance. However, it is my opinion that each of the delegates was supplied with far too much reading material and background data, which