

the public have a right to the fullest information. What is the object of making explanations at all? That the public may be able to judge whether the retiring ministry have acted right or wrong. They are the parties upon trial; and they have a right to expect permission to state everything necessary for their complete justification. It would be as unprecedented as it would be useless for the sovereign or his representative to limit the explanations of Ministers, because any attempt to do so would be invariably met, as Mr. Baldwin declared in the House he would have met it, viz., 'by a refusal to say one word until the required permission should be granted.'

Now, with this reasoning I entirely agree as far as it goes; but it omits the very points at issue. We are not enquiring what ought to be in the abstract, but what was the fact in the case? To prove what ought to be and what was, are two different things. It is with facts, not with expediency, that we have to do. This fallacy of shifting the ground argues badly for the cause in which it is employed. But there is still another fallacy in this attempt at reasoning—another shifting of the ground—another shirking of the question. It is not whether ministers ought "to state every thing necessary for their complete justification;" but whether the Crown has not a voice in deciding that point as well as the retiring ministers? It is admitted by Mr. Hincks that ministers cannot explain at all without the permission of the Crown; can they then explain any more than they are permitted? Certainly not. Have not the late Councillors given explanations which have not only not been permitted, but against which the Crown has protested? I am not now enquiring whether they gave any explanations not necessary to their justification—that will be considered in another place; all such evasions of the question argue the untenableness of the proceeding of the late Councillors. I am now enquiring—Did the Crown consent to the explanation which they gave? The protest of the Crown is proof demonstrative that it did not; and a hundred columns of speeches, and as many evasions, cannot prove it otherwise.

When they found that the Crown dissented from their explanation, what was their duty? Undoubtedly to defer their explanation until the Crown and they should agree upon the facts to be explained. But suppose no such agreement could have been come to? I answer, in the first place, ministers should have tried whether such an agreement could not have been come to. Secondly, if the Crown and they could not have agreed upon the facts to be explained, they would have refused to explain; and the Parliament would have applied for the correspondence which had taken place between the Crown and its late advisers. Thus the whole affair would have been fairly brought before parliament. Thus the House of Commons, not satisfied with the statements made, applied to the Crown and obtained all the letters which had passed between the King and his Ministers,

the Earl of Oxford and Lord Chancellor Somers.

Had the late ministers furnished the Crown in writing, with their advice and negotiation (as did Sir Robert Peel) then there could not have been by any possibility a difference between the Crown and them as to the grounds of their resignation, and consequently no difference as to their intended explanation. This they carefully avoided doing. When they determined to resign, instead of preparing the "case of facts," they thought it "necessary for their complete justification," to give such a version of the affair as would tell best upon the parliament and the country; (how far it was correct I shall enquire in the sequel;) and they bring it before parliament, not with the sanction of the Crown, but in the face of the Governor General's solemn protest against its fairness and truth! such a proceeding cannot be paralleled in the history of Responsible Government throughout the world.

So much as to the facts of this proceeding. Now as to the principles and consequences involved.

Was it not a practical wresting from the Crown the sceptre of its prerogative, and the essential shield of its character, and safety?

If the late Councillors denied the Crown even a consenting to their "case of facts"—their parliamentary explanation—can they allege that they regarded its prerogative much in any thing else?

If they claimed to use the authority of the Crown as a "tool" to sanction a party as well as an *exparte* explanation, can they prove that they did not seek to use it as a "tool" for the promotion of other party purposes?

If they practically asserted their right to do as they pleased in regard to their "explanation," regardless of the protest of the Crown, is it improbable that they asserted the right of equal discretion in regard to all other acts, whether the Crown consented or protested?

If they practically asserted the right to deal with the character of the Crown as they pleased—to attribute to it what sentiments or acts they pleased in the teeth of its own solemn protests—is it unlikely they sought to dispose of the *patronage* of the Crown? The greater includes the less—and who will not say that character is greater than patronage?

I state these questions not as facts but as legitimate inferences, and as subjects for serious reflection. The facts at which they point will be hereafter examined.

And what are the consequences involved in such a precedent and proceedings? Does it not remove from the Crown the only safeguard of its honor, and strip it of the last weapon for the defence of its character? Suppose the Governor to be the reader, and the reader to be one of an association of 7 or 8 employed in deliberation on public matters; that differences arose, and the reader stood alone; that a dissolution of their association followed; that the other 7 should draw up a statement for publication of those differences, and in it ascribe various execrable sentiments and acts to the reader, which he

wholly
lish, and
be beaten
but won
God, or
vidual
case, m
character
advisers
his own
secrecy
ble; the
phrased
vornor
and his
foot bal
to Cana
fifty ye
months
butes o
length,
pierced
which C

And
during
now see
truth o
speech
tion," a
choly re

Withi
"Addre
Reform
meeting
May, 18
one of t
this mo
self, if t
character
in all pa
of libert
nor in t
be true,
Charles
enemy t
—a hyp
outraged
than Ch
despot t
a Sovere
forfeit h

And v
charges
Excellen
tional a
kindred
sociation
which t
under th
ral! I
which, a
duct, he
Aristide
And tho
and thes
first frui
Respons
to be the
the last

And t