Supply

In the lower mainland of British Columbia there are one and a half million people. If 500,000 were killed, there would still be one million left who would survive in some capacity. If there were an all-out nuclear war, it has been estimated by witnesses before the committee that 500 million people out of the four billion on the face of the earth would be eradicated. We usually speak in terms of five million or ten million in conventional wars. The price is too high. The price of one million is too high. The price of 100,000 is too high. The price of a thousand, of a hundred, of one, is too high. Even if these unspeakable weapons were never unleashed, who in the House could really justify the billions of wasted dollars and the resources which could have helped a world so full of human suffering and deprivation?

I, too, campaign for peace. I, too, will march for peace. I, too, will stand and preach for peace. Military expansion must stop. Peace must begin. Peace must be given a chance. How can we prevent the unspeakable? How can we prevent this terrible Armageddon that I have just described? Is the answer to be found in pacificism, or is it to be found in nuclear bullying by superiority of either the East or the West, or in deterrence? The motivation for bullying nations varies from ideological reasons, which may or may not be expansionary, to insecurity. If nations were not expansionary in their ideology and felt sure of their own sovereignty, war would cease to be the factor of major concern that it is today.

Human beings, regardless of ideology, naturally seek security, both personally and collectively. We have not had nuclear disarmament or even reductions in nuclear arms because the essential element of negotiations is mutual trust between nations. There is a need to develop a political will to establish the motivation for concrete measures to reduce the level of risk. Confidence-building measures must be developed to lessen the mutual distrust which pervades the relationship between east and west. The pursuit of peace can realistically be achieved through mutual respect for one's capability through the balance of power.

Ideally, however, and we must also strive for the ideal, peace can only be maintained indefinitely if it is in fact based on good will and the spirit of peace. That spirit of peace does not start between nations. That spirit of peace starts inside the individual parts of all mankind. It starts in us as individuals, in you and me, in our determination to participate and seek solutions tonight. Whatever our solution may be, while some of us may be right and some of us may be wrong, the desire starts here for all of us. If we cannot find that desire and if we cannot find the internal peace, we will never ever find peace in this world. We must expand that sense of peace and commitment through our own personal lives to our community and to the larger community of man.

The way to build the political will for peace in today's world is through recognized and respected adoption of specific spheres of influence. This must be joined to an arms control policy which will work toward achieving mutual, balanced and verifiable reduction of nuclear arms at all levels, from the highest denominator to the lowest possible denominator. This statement of mutual reduction of nuclear arms at all levels, from the highest to the lowest levels possible, is another

consensus that we have here today. The only dispute is over the means of achieving the end.

The catastrophic consequences of another world war, with or without nuclear weapons, make deterrence of conflict the highest objective. It is imperative that we prevent deterrence from turning into coercion in order to prevent coercion from becoming conflict. The deterrence of conflict is dependent upon the perception of the nature and source of the threat to peace. That threat to peace differs depending on the position from which one sees it. However, for the western democracies, the threat that we are conditioned to or that we believe in, that we are in fact preparing for, because that is what NORAD and NATO are all about, is from the Soviet Union.

• (2120)

Soviet military spending is impossible to calculate exactly, but the most impeccable sources place it conservatively, and our committee was told it was even higher, at 13 per cent of gross national product. The United States and its allies spend approximately 3 per cent of their gross national product. Soviet arms spending has risen steadily in real terms over the last 12 years, while western arms spending has fallen and is only now attempting to match Soviet increases. No one likes that attempt. No one is pleased at the attempt to waste more money for the building of arms.

As the Soviet Union moves closer to rough parity in nuclear weapons, and that is generally accepted today, and to the overall narrow margin of superiority in both conventional and nuclear power that they now possess, we have to look at their position in the world. Unfortunately we see their intent expressed more aggressively in their attempts to forcefully expand at least their influence around the globe.

They backed Cuban proxies in Angola in 1975, backed Ethiopia in the Ogaden in 1977, supported Vietnam, the fifth largest standing army in the world, in various excursions into Kampuchea, and invaded Afghanistan. More recently we have seen the Soviet Union-inspired imposition of martial law in Poland and the destabilization of Central America. That is the concern. The concern is the intent.

Some people might say the British in their development period established colonies throughout the world. Also, we worked through a period of the United Nations of decolonization, and Britain finding its own place in space and time. The United States could perhaps at this stage be accused of the same thing. That does not mean we should now tolerate a new wave of expansionism in the name of the Soviet Union.

Determining the intent of the Soviet Union, therefore, has become more and more important as they move toward the window of opportunity. It is in that window of opportunity in 1984-85 when the clarity of this superiority will in fact reveal the clear reality or lack of reality of the threat which may exist to this part of the world.

While the United States practised the theory of detente during the 1970s by transferring high technology to the Soviets