

sion for the wartime entry of American forces into Canadian territory might well be made without the maintenance of an integrated command in peacetime. Your Committee believes, however, that Canada's sovereignty would be protected best in wartime by that arrangement which offers the best chance for an effective defence. It has drawn the conclusion that, in the event of hostilities, an integrated command would be far more effective than separate but coordinated national commands.

It can be argued that provision of the most effective air defence should not form the basis of Canadian policy, because such a defence will become necessary only in the event of hostilities which would themselves represent the ultimate failure of Western policy and which would render irrelevant Canada's fears for its sovereignty vis-à-vis the United States. Your Committee doubts the weight of this argument. NORAD is a purely defensive agreement, uniquely concerned with intrusions by a third party into Canadian and American airspace. From Canada's perspective or from that of the United States, or from both, such intrusions could well be serious enough to warrant American involvement and yet not lead to actual war. In such cases the integrated command enhances Canada's sovereignty in the sense that it maximizes Canada's ability to deal with substantial invasions of its sovereign airspace.

D. Military Relations with the United States

Through its participation in NORAD, Canada has derived a number of military benefits which it could not have had on its own and which it might not be able to retain to the same degree if it withdrew from further participation in the integrated command.

In the case of information concerning a possible bomber attack, withdrawal from the integrated command should create no real problem for Canada, since the United States would still want to use radars situated for this purpose on Canadian territory. It is less likely, however, that Canada would be able to retain direct access, available now through the facilities at the Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado Springs, to information on all missile launchings anywhere in the world. None of the ballistic missile warning sensors are located in Canada. This information is of some value in helping those responsible for the development of Canadian defence and foreign policy to stay abreast of strategic developments. It is also helpful in the planning of emergency defence arrangements to be put into effect in the event of a nuclear attack. However, some of this information would be available to Canada through NATO, even if NORAD were not renewed. Since Canada bears no responsibility for control of the strategic retaliatory forces, and is not otherwise an important strategic actor, it is doubtful that there is a vital need for Canada to have more of this type of information than it could get through NATO channels.

Similarly, in the case of space objects, Canada now has direct access to comprehensive information through NORAD, although its sole contribution to the collection of

that information, a small one, is the Baker-Nunn camera located at Cold Lake. This direct access could be lost if Canada withdrew from the integrated command. Canada's need for this information, however, is a limited one which could probably be satisfied through the United Nations, which itself receives a great deal of the information collected by the United States.

Defence cooperation with the United States also enables the Canadian Armed Forces to acquire information about, and familiarity with, some American weapons, defence research and military techniques. In the case of air defence, most of this is more or less directly related to NORAD, either through supplementary agreements or as a function of the close working relationship that has developed between the two countries' forces over the years through the integrated command structure.

Finally, it is to be noted that without NORAD Canada would have no access to defensive nuclear weapons for its interceptor aircraft. Without such air-to-air nuclear missiles, it is doubtful whether Canadian forces aircraft could mount an effective defence against a serious attack by Soviet bombers. Given that Canada contemplates maintenance only of a very limited defensive capability anyway, your Committee believes that the loss of access to nuclear weapons would diminish considerably the military effectiveness of Canada's air defence capability. Alone, however, your Committee does not regard the loss as a determining consideration with respect to future participation in NORAD.

In each of the cases considered here, your Committee believes that the military benefits derived from participation in NORAD are not vital to Canada. Nevertheless, they are of significant value. The defence force that Canadians wish to maintain is a modern one, relying on skilled and dedicated personnel using sophisticated technology. Yet given the great variety of tasks that a modern defence force can be called upon to perform, and the rapidity with which defence technologies become obsolete, it is difficult for a country of Canada's size, with Canada's national priorities, to maintain its forces at an adequate level of readiness. That the Canadian Armed Forces have nevertheless been able to achieve a highly sophisticated and diversified capability is due in some part to their having participated in alliances, especially with the United States. Your Committee believes, therefore, that the close working relationship established between the Canadian air defence forces and their American counterparts, through NORAD, is a factor of continuing importance in the consideration of Canada's future policy towards the NORAD agreement.

E. Economic Considerations

NORAD has been of considerable direct economic value to Canada in the past, in that it saved the government the cost of acquiring as large a national air defence force as would otherwise have been necessary. It has also involved