these exchanges might lead to data exchanges and declarations on ballistic missile R & D activities, ballistic missile flight test and space launchers, and ballistic missile characteristics. They might even lead to some constraints on the acquisition and deployment of ballistic missiles.

Development of joint exercises involving early warning of ballistic missile launches is a measure now underway between United States and the Russian Federation. Development of similar exercises between India and Pakistan might contribute to regional stability in several ways: it would be an opportunity to participate together in an exercise which enhances strategic stability; it would provide each country with some assurance of its technological ability to detect a launch; if successful, it might deter either country from attempting a ballistic missile attack because of the probability of early detection and the possible advance responses. Third parties could play an important role in developing, promoting, and directing such exercises.

While it is unlikely that the two countries would freeze their missile development and production activities at this point in their rocky relationship, encouragement could be given to a regional agreement not to deploy ballistic missiles with operational military forces, or more generally not to deploy such missiles outside designated production, testing, or storage facilities. This measure does not preclude missile development or production, and thus carries with it some chance for acceptance. The parties would need to declare the locations of the missiles, but the missiles themselves would not be subject to inspection. Verification could consist of a combination of national technical means, unattended sensors at particularly sensitive sites, satellite imagery provided by SPOT or other commercially-available sources, and third-party inspections of the exclusion zone. Remote sensing satellites such as Canada's "Radarsat" could play a role in agreed cooperative monitoring programs.

Cooperative missile flight test monitoring would provide a means to demonstrate to the two parties methods for determining that a missile test launch has occurred. Notification of a planned test launch would be necessary, along with information regarding the type of missile, the expected date of the test, the geographical coordinates of the site of the launcher and the location of the target area. Cooperative monitoring techniques such as tamper-protected IR, acoustic, and seismic sensors near a launch facility could be utilized; data could be remotely transmitted to a jointly-operated monitoring station. Gaining experience in monitoring missile test launches might permit the parties to agree, over time, to a ban on certain ballistic missile flight tests.<sup>44</sup>

Sandia National Laboratories and the U.S. ACDA have developed provisions for a hypothetical missile monitoring agreement which considers questions the parties would have to address if they were to negotiate a missile non-deployment regime. Lawrence Scheinman, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation." Paper prepared for the Shanghai Initiative, Goa, India, January 1995.