

applied without the annual search for new and ad hoc formulae, based partly on principle and partly on expediency, combined with other controversial elements, agreeable to this or that group, but which inevitably cause opposing reactions in other groups.

The need is for a method of financing which will contain the three fundamental principles enunciated by the Chairman of the Latin American group: the need to ensure the success of any operation, the affirmation of collective responsibility, and the safe-guarding of the position of the countries who must devote all their energies and substance to economic development. It follows from the first principle that reliance on voluntary contributions from one or two countries is undesirable. We should not, of course, exclude any gestures on the part of any member state aimed at reducing the collective burden, but it would be unwise for us to base our assessment scale on the expectation of such contributions.

We are aware that the percentage for assessment in the Tunisia-Pakistan draft depends upon just such voluntary contributions. I hope that my Delegation does not sound ungrateful if we say that we accept this only because it is a necessity for what is, in our opinion, the overriding consideration: the success of the Congo operation at this time. But we do not consider, I repeat, that this sort of financing is, in principle, sound or desirable.

Nor do we consider desirable the singling out for special contributions of individual states or groups of states, whatever the political judgment is on the effects of their actions. This observation applies in varying degree to both draft resolutions before us. In the case of the Latin American resolution, states having investments in the Congo are specially assessed, and in the Tunisia-Pakistan draft, Belgium is singled out. In any scale that we construct, which will be valid for all operations and which can be applied in any new circumstance with a minimum of political judgment involved, we should look to capacity to pay, and the effect of the bill on the economies of the member states.

I do not wish to enter into details now of what should or should not be in the resolution that we pass at this time. In spite of our reservations, the Canadian Delegation will support the Tunisia-Pakistan draft resolution provided it is not amended so as to take it even further from our position. We believe this resolution as it is now worded offers the best possible solution - what we might call a balance of dissatisfaction - under the present circumstances. We accept it, and I wish to make this very clear, only as an interim solution, and we do not wish our acceptance to be construed in any way as an acceptance of any part of the resolution as a principle for future resolutions. We wish to be very sure that the examination which our resolution calls for will be based on consideration of all points of view, without any attempt to use this or that ad hoc resolution which we have adopted in the past, to sanctify this or that method of apportioning costs.

... While insisting that the resolution which the Canadian Delegation will support be considered ad hoc, we insist at the same time that it is still a financing resolution to be passed by this Assembly under the authority given to it by Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter. My Delegation cannot admit, therefore, the right of any state to decide whether or not it should pay its share of these costs, such as has been announced by two permanent members of the Security Council and others. Nor can my Delegation contemplate the imposition of conditions by member states under which they would not pay their assessed share, such as were imposed by the Representative of Belgium.