

its first report to the House of Commons in December, 1963. The recommendations of the committee were unanimous in accepting a Canadian role in NATO, but suggested further study was needed before pronouncing on the final disposition of the forces. Even though there was only agreement on the fundamental principle that "Canadian forces should remain in Europe" ³² it represented a welcome change from the earlier period. But while the committee recommend further study before formulation of new policy the Minister of National Defence was preparing his White Paper on Defence.

Tabled in March 1964 the White Paper purported to outline Canadian defence policy for the next ten years, and raised two important points for this study. In reviewing NATO strategy the White Paper accepted the strategy of graduated deterrence, and in recognizing NATO as a nuclear-armed defensive alliance" accepted that "one can not be a member of a military alliance and at the same time avoid some share of responsibility for its strategic policies."³³ In this situation the Government decided to accept the existing roles for the Canadian forces in Europe,³⁴ and accepted the position that the troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. (See Appendix 1 for further statements on this point.) Here the groundwork was laid for an issue which was to become increasingly important in the next few years. Should the Canadian forces remain in Europe? And, whether they remain or not, what should be their primary role? Only the NDP considered this question to be of great importance in 1964-65.

Andrew Brewin's Stand on Guard (1965) ably expressed the party's position:

Canada should abandon the effort to maintain a forward brigade in Germany and contribution to the air strike forces in Central Europe....Canada should concentrate on a highly mobile conventional tri-service force available for peacekeeping...and also as a mobile reserve for NATO.³⁵

This statement would seem to indicate that Canada should pull out of Europe, but earlier Brewin rejects this position by suggesting Canada "maintain a mobile force in Europe as part of the mobile reserve."³⁶ The Conservatives, on the other hand, maintained there was no nuclear commitment on the part of Canada in Europe (at least some of the party hierarchy took this stand), and the Liberals committed themselves to opt out of the nuclear role as soon as practicable. (This seems to have been accepted as either: i) when the military usefulness of the systems are outmoded, and this is agreed upon by the other members of NATO, or ii) at the end of the life span of the present systems).

On the other major external NATO issues which arose prior to 1967 the Government and Opposition parties were in substantial agreement. Canadian participation in some form of multi-lateral nuclear force never became a partisan issue, and when the question of France pulling out of the integrated military structure became crucial there was no serious party dissension. (See Appendix 1 on both these issues for the position of the Government). However, the White Paper did raise another party issue