

peace prepare for war," it may be useful and interesting to glance at our condition of preparation for such an event, as the survey will increase our people's confidence in themselves, and enable them to appreciate justly our own and our neighbours' relations and duties towards each other, and towards the rest of the civilized world.

Before the last war was declared by the American Congress in 1812, Canada was threatened with invasion by three armies of 50,000 men each, namely, one to enter the Province at Amherstburgh, another to cross the Niagara river, and the third to march upon Montreal. In reply to these threats it was declared by many in Canada, that 50,000 men could not be raised for a regular army in all the United States, and the event proved the opinion to be correct, for their regular army never amounted to half that number during the whole war. The greatest number ever assembled at one point was on the Niagara frontier in 1814, under General Izod, and it did not exceed 11,000 men.

After the lapse of a quarter of a century, we may venture to prophecy again, that even now, 50,000 men cannot be enlisted for a regular army in the United States. In a country where every labouring man can earn a comfortable livelihood, we may be assured that but comparatively few can be found to take up arms for the purpose of foreign aggression. Were we to invade the United States, then indeed every possible resistance would be made to the invaders, and a large part of the population, if not the whole *en masse*, would take arms to defend their country; but in an offensive war on another land and people very few would be willing to engage personally, except the mere refuse population of their cities and towns. The reflecting people of the States must be confident of their perfect security from every thing like permanent conquest, and they can have no desire to see their country involved in war; but there are among them many desperate men, some thousands along the northern frontier, desperate in fortune and character, and with little or no hope of redeeming either. The voice of this class and all they could influence would doubtless be for war, as the means of gaining something in the general strife. During the past three years we have seen many evils produced by the agitation excited by these

men, much blood shed, and the ruin of many families. Suppose the counsel of these men prevails, let us speculate on the probable results.

We could not reasonably expect to be in a better state of preparation than at present.—We have about 15,000 of the finest troops the world ever saw: there are residing in the country some thousands of retired officers and soldiers, including many naval officers: the events of the last three years have called into active service a considerable portion of the militia, and in fact we may be called a martial people.—We have abundance of naval and military stores, and the country is full of provisions.—In a few weeks our entire male population might take the field, and be organized and led under some of the most experienced and excellent officers in the British service, in whose skill and courage all would have unbounded confidence.

Under what circumstances must our opponents take the field? They must first of all consume many months in recruiting their army to 50,000 men, if it would not take years to raise and organize that number. When organized and in the field, what must be the state of their officers and non-commissioned officers as to military knowledge and experience? As to experience, they must be wholly without it; and their knowledge must be extremely superficial and limited. Their men could have but little confidence in them, and in this most important of all martial acquirements their troops would be greatly our inferiors. We do not hesitate to declare, that, if by magic an American army were this day ready to invade the five provinces, we have the means now at command to destroy or drive them back immediately.

It may be said that they would not scatter their force, and attack us at many places, but would concentrate it upon one or two vulnerable points. Be it so, and let them obtain temporary possession of a portion of our territory; have we not seen that even in the winter of 1837-8, a regiment of troops was conveyed from Halifax to Amherstburgh? and do we not see how rapidly we could concentrate our forces upon any point, and bear with our whole power on any body of invaders, during the season of military operations? And let it not be forgotten that the more numerous the forces assembled against us at any one point were, the