

four guns, two or more batteries would have to be brigaded together under a lieutenant-colonel. The four gun unit is a convenient and correct one, it can be sub-divided into the two gun divisional unit without dislocation. A six gun battery, if divided into half batteries, breaks up a subaltern's two gun command, which should not be done. Our four guns are taught to manoeuvre without their waggons, which, under the old system, formed an inconvenient rear rank, without offensive power, necessitating adherence to the old fashioned fancy of pivot and reverse flanks and numerical order of guns and waggons, which it was thought necessary to maintain.

A Canadian four gun battery with its wagons safely under cover in rear, is a very handy fighting unit, not interfering with the formations of other arms, which it can be quickly manoeuvred to support from any direction.

ARTILLERY FIGHTING TACTICS IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER ARMS.

Field artillery tactics may be considered under four heads:

1st. Tentative, or trying the strength of the enemy in connection with the "advance cavalry" of an army, or with the "advance guard."

The cavalry man may find and feel the enemy, but they cannot probe him, force him to unmask, touch his masses or reserves, nor compel him to delay his advance, by deploying his masses. This, the advanced artillery, when judiciously handled, can effectively do, but no General should allow his whole army to be committed to attack by a couple of advanced guns, as General Burrows appears to have done at the battle of Maidwand. If it is necessary to force the enemy's hand by the forward advance of a few guns, when they have done their business and cannot be supported by the troops accompanying them, they must retire, and may be lost, but it must be remembered that guns may be lost with honor, though this should seldom be in an advance.

On the other hand, great advantages may be gained by the judicious handling of a few guns with the advanced cavalry. The strength of cavalry does not lie in fire. Fire from the saddle is useless, and in dismounting to fire the number of horse-holders necessary, seriously diminishes the effective fire.

When a mass of horses, except under unusual conditions, are exposed to the enemy's fire, the loss of horses would absolutely cripple the the cavalry, and horses taught to lie down under cover has not yet become part of cavalry instruction.

Artillery is the fire complement necessary to cavalry against infantry attack or superior cavalry attack, while for the offensive a few guns would in a few minutes drive an enemy out of a village, no matter how numerously posted without artillery, the cavalry and guns could then occupy. In a similar manner a bridge may be seized and held by a handful of advanced cavalry and a couple of guns. In the same manner the re-entering angle of a river, with a ford or where it is intended to construct a bridge for the passage of your army, may be held by sweeping the opposite projecting angle of the shore with guns converging on it from the opposite side of the river.

To be Continued.

Correspondence.

To the Editor of the CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW.

DEAR SIR,—I find that a muzzle velocity of 1,240 feet has been obtained with the Martini-Henry rifle, and it would appear from a New York paper quoted in the last number of your valuable *Review* that the United States Ordnance Department have obtained in their experiments only 1,252 feet. This is a rather serious discrepancy that should, I think, make us accept with distrust other results published in the New York paper.

Yours truly,

OSCAR PREVOST,
Captain, C.A.

Quebec, 11th May, 1881,

To the Editor of the CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW.

SIR,—With reference to the review of my little work on "Military Administration," which appeared in your issue of the 1st instant, I have to express my surprise that because I differ totally from the opinions frequently expressed in the *MILITARY REVIEW* relating to conscription, I should be accused of timidly following in the "rut" of those who are afraid of expressing their opinions, and of teaching what I do not consider true.

Whatever be my personal views I do not consider it my duty to criticize the military policy of the Government. I serve in a book intended for use as a text-book in a public institution, especially as this is a political question. I have entered into the relative merits of conscription and voluntary service at some length, showing clearly the advantages and disadvantages of each system, and no one who reads the book can fail to see the great advantage of compulsory service from a purely military aspect, nor the great hardship such a system entails on the citizens of a country.

I deny the "dire necessity" for conscription for the British army, nor do I think compulsory service feasible for an army which is stationed in all parts of the world, and conscription could in any case only be introduced for a home army. The ballot may be enforced for the militia, should volunteering not produce the required number of recruits, and the duty every subject owes to the defence of his country is fully recognized in England as elsewhere.

The insinuation that I teach, what I do not consider true I pass over as beneath notice merely pointing out that feelings of honour should lead the writer to make an apology for such an unwarranted statement.

The remarks you have allowed to be inserted in the *Military Review* would not be worthy of any refutation had they appeared in an ordinary newspaper, but as you are universally believed to be an officer of high standing in this country such an attack on me needs a reply and I have consequently to request you to be good enough to insert this letter in your next issue.

I remain

Your obedient servant,

DOUGLAS JONES,
Major R. A.

[The portions of the above letter which we have put in italics plainly admit the opinion expressed by us in our *critique*. Conscription has a military as well as a political side, as has the subject of strategy, yet no general could effectually serve his country or be held blameless who thought fit to ignore the political strategy of an impending campaign, and advised or taught his countrymen only to consider the military aspect of strategy. Neither the hardships of conscription or of any other sort of duty render it less a duty, and from the unpleasant duty of criticism the *CANADIAN MILITARY REVIEW* has no intention of shrinking, nor have we any intention of apologizing for doing what we considered a duty. On the other hand, the writer of the letter attributes to us opinions never expressed in the *C.M.R.* We never advocated conscription for the British army stationed in all parts of the world; but only for the Militia with exemptions for efficient volunteers, so as to avoid destroying what we call the regular army by turning men out of it after short service in the hope of forming a national reserve. The regular army of 100,000 effectives or thereabouts is too small a mill to grind out a national reserve, and it has destroyed itself in the effort, without making a reserve, which, even if it could be collected or relied upon with certainty, would not equal one *corps d'armée* of any real military nation. Major Jones