

compelled to change their allegiance. It was nothing to him that the great mass of them were strongly opposed to German rule, and that more than 50,000 preferred to abandon home and property and go into exile rather than be subjects of the German empire. A Prussian statesman, heir to the traditions of Frederic the Great, could have no qualms at violating the principle of nationality. But if all things were lawful to Bismarck, all things were certainly not expedient. There are odd hints to be found in his queer, frank conversations—with Crispi for example—that he sometimes doubted whether the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine was worth to Germany what it cost her—the steady hostility of France. For if the most obvious result of the Franco-German war has been the growth of German power and arrogance, there is another not less important to the world, the resolute recuperation of the French people. From the downfall of the first Napoleon to the downfall of the second France never had a policy, or rather, she had by fits and starts a score. From the disasters of 1870 to our own time she has had but one—to make herself so strong that never again should she be the victim unallied and unprepared of German arms. If we choose to seek