

composing the English Empire . . . ought to be in charge of a specially constituted tribunal fitted by training to act judicially where the judicial method was applicable;" and he pointed out that that tribunal was the King-in-Council. That tribunal still exists and flourishes in full vigour, and it is that tribunal which I call "Another Supreme Court."

It is not intended here to reiterate what has been so well stated in Mr. Snow's address but rather to supplement it: nor shall I go largely into the history of this tribunal. All who are interested will find its history traced in an address before the Missouri Bar Association in 1909, published in the *American Law Review* for 1910, pp. 161-176.

Confining my remarks in great measure to the present and the recent, the first thing that is to be said is that this "Court" is not a court at all. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is simply a committee for special purposes of the Privy Council of the King.

In theory the King is the fountain of all justice throughout his dominions, and from time immemorial he has exercised jurisdiction in his Council which acts in an advisory capacity to the Crown. In theory also every subject has the right to submit his grievances to the King—"to seek the foot of the throne." Petitions of that nature which came before the King were after the development of Parliament referred in most part to Parliament which thus became the chief appellate tribunal. From early in the fourteenth century Receivers and Triers of petitions were appointed to relieve Parliament of clerical and routine work and to aid in the administration of