

enthusiasm about the Russo-German war, and that the celebrations of the first anniversary of Japan's accession to the Tripartite Pact (on September 27th) were "restrained" in character. Two facts seemed to emerge: that the possibility of Japanese armed intervention against Russia was governed by German (not Japanese) wishes; and that, meanwhile, Japan was playing for time. Mr. Churchill's "blunt warning" of November 10th made it clear that if Japan made war against the United States, Britain would declare war "within the hour;" and it also indicated that powerful ships of the Royal Navy were now available for service in the Pacific if necessary. A statement by the Secretary of the Navy the following day also emphasized the "instant readiness" of the United States for defence in the Pacific area. When, two days later, Congress approved the amendments to the Neutrality Act of 1939, the way was opened for some reallocation of the battle fleets of both Britain and the United States in the Far Eastern waters.

Over the past three weeks events have moved rapidly.

On November 14th the Japanese Diet convened in emergency session and voted a large war appropriation.

On the following day Saburo Kurusu, the special Japanese envoy, arrived in the United States, to continue with Admiral Nomura the conversations already held at Washington.

President Roosevelt announced that United States Marines (about 1,000 officers and men) were to be withdrawn from the Chinese ports of Peiping, Tientsin and Shanghai.